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The dismal science has never been short of prophets of doom, so
that it will be no surprise to discover that, in spite of the fact that
in the last decade the British people have enjoyed a standard of liv-
ing higher than any they had known previously, the Jeremiahs have
wailed long and loud about the poor performance of the British
economy. One has only to look at the course of the balance of pay-
ments to understand why this should be so, for there were six "cri-
sis" years between 1947 and 1957.1 Moreover, there can be no doubt
that in postwar growth rates the United Kingdom' does not show up
very well in the international league,2 so that I can only suppose
that the U.K. was included among the countries in this survey in
order to provide our hosts with solace, for we certainly cannot pro-
vide them with inspiration.
Limitations of space will not permit a detailed diagnosis here of
the various afflictions from which the British economy is believed to
suffer, but the one that is mentioned most often is that the level of
investment is too low.3 However, since economic policy generally has
been severely constrained by balance-of-payments considerations and
Noit: For conversion purposes, 1 pound =$2.80,or £0.357 =$1.
See M. F. G. Scott "The Balance of Payments Crises," in G. D. N. Wors.
wick and P. H. Ady The British Economy in the Nineteen-Fifties, London,
1962.
Economic Survey of the United Kingdom—March 1962, OECD, Paris.
Diagram 2, p. 12.
For a selection of such diagnoses, see Fourth Report, Council on Prices,
Productivity and Incomes, London, July 1961, paras. 13if.; Economic Survey
of the United Kingdom—March 1962; Tore Browaldh, "A Swedish View of
Britain's Economy," Three Banks Review, June 1963; Robert Hall, "Changes
in the Industrial Structure of Britain," Lloyds Bank Review', January 1963;and
Duncan Burn, "Why Investment Has Fallen," Lloyds Bank Review, April 1963.Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
the demands for full employment, and the budget has been used
as the major redistributive mechanism, it is hardly surprising that
there has been little time, energy, or resources left for a long hard
look at more distant prospects. And since "there has been no close
consideration of the structure of taxation in relation to it
is hardly surprising that the impact of tax policy upon growth pros-
pects has been erratic and rather haphazard. There are now some
signs that this state of affairs may soon be replaced by more purpo-
sive planning, but it should be fully realized at the outset that,
when talking about tax policy in relation to growth in postwar
Britain, the growth aspect of a given policy measure has usually
been incidental to its main purpose.
The present tax structure5 is, of course, a legacy from a period
when the fostering of growth was not an important consideration.
It has, therefore, been argued that without a radical recasting of the
entire structure, no significant progress will be possible. Some hint
of the way the wind is blowing in this respect may be gleaned from
the report of the National Economic Development Council quoted
6
Fora full examination of the impact on growth of taxation a study of
systems abroad is also necessary. Continental countries have grown faster
than the United Kingdom in recent years and their tax systems may have
contributed to this. Although total taxes in the United Kingdom bear
much the same relation to the national income, about a third, as in
other industrial countries... theBritish system differs significantly from
the continental system. Three of the differences are:first, most of the
continental countries collect more of their taxes for social security pur-
poses on the basis of payroll charges; second, these countries generally
have a tax of the turnover type, or in the case of France a value-added
type, covering a wider field than the British purchase tax; third, import
duties are levied on food to protect agriculture in contrast to the Brit-
ish practice of free entry for most food products and the subsidising of
home production.
Rather than speculate on possible future developments along these
or other lines, it is my intention here to confine the discussion to
Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, National Economic Development
Council, London, 1963, para. 161.
For a bird's-eye view of the present tax structure, see The British System
of Taxation, Central Office of Information Reference Pamphlet 10, London.
0ConditionsFavourable to Faster Growth, para. 163.Great Britain
British experiences with certain specific tax measures which are be-
lieved to have had some significant (positive or negative) effects
upon growth, usually through their influence on the amount or
composition of private capital formation.
In Section II the differential taxation of distributed and undistrib-
uted profits is discussed. Then in Section III the various capital al-
lowances granted for tax purposes are examined in some detail, for
it is probably here that the British contribution is most distinctive,
and, together with differential profits taxation, capital allowances
have excited the most attention both in Britain and abroad. Section
IV gives briefer consideration to the special problems surrounding
innovation and risk-taking, and the tax measures bearing upon
them. Work incentives are the main subject of Section V, and Sec-
tion VI concludes with a general appraisal of the role of tax policy
in promoting economic growth in postwar Britain.
II. DISTRIBUTED VERSUS UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS
A. The Law7
The taxation of business profits is accomplished in two ways. Un-
incorporated businesses are subject to the income tax and the sur-
tax on roughly the same basis as individuals. These two taxes to-
gether constitute a highly progressive tax (see Chart l).8 In most
•branches of industry, however, the unincorporated segment is of
minor importance, and consequently attention will here be concen-
trated mainly .on companies.
Companies are also subject to a two-tier system of taxation: the
income tax (at the standard rate only) and also the profits tax. Sub-
ject to the three qualifications listed below, these two taxes jointly
constitute a proportional tax on profits:
A further brief description of these taxes will be found in Taxation in
Western Europe, Federation of British Industries, London. A comprehensive
exposition is given in G. S. A. Wheatcroft, The Law of Income Tax, Surtax
and Profits Tax, London, 1962.
a For an analytical description, and a comparison with the United States, sce
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. The income tax(butnot the profits tax) is regarded in princi-
ple as {alling upon shareholders and is simply collected from com-
panies as a matter of convenience. Thus, from gross dividends pay-
able to shareholders, companies are required to deduct income tax at
the standard rate, paying only the net amount, and retaining the
The profits tax, on the other hand, is regarded explicitly
as a tax upon the company, and shareholders' tax assessments are
not adjusted in any way to take account of payment of the profits
tax by their companies. An adjustment is, however, made to ensure
that profits remitted by one company to another ("franked invest-
ment income") do not bear the profits tax more than once.
2. If profits in any year are less than £2,000, the company is
exempt from the profits tax;if profits are between £2,000 and
£12,000, there is an "abatement" provision whereby a company is
exempt from the profits tax on one-fifth of the amount by which
profits fall short of £12,000. Neither of these provisions applies to
the income tax.
3. Until 1958 the profits tax included a provision for "nondistri-
bution relief," which had the effect of taxing undistributed profits
at a substantially lower rate than distributed profits (see Table 1).
To complement this, a "distribution charge" was levied if profits
which had enjoyed the nondistribution relief were subsequently dis-
tributed, this charge having the effect of canceling the original re-
lief. Neither of these provisions applied to the income tax.
It is this third complication that will be our chief concern in the
following sections, together with the general role of self-finance in
industrial growth in postwar Britain.
B. The Issues in Principle
In its Final Report,l° the Royal Commission on the Taxation of
Profits and Income (hereafter referred to as the RCT) recommended
that the differentiation between distributed and undistributed
profits in the profits tax be replaced by a single-rate tax on all profits,
°If the amount of tax due on the dividend receipts of any particular share-
holder differs from the standard rate of income tax as deducted at source, an
adjustment will be made accordingly in that taxpayers personal assessment.
9474,London,1955.402 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE I






Rate of Dis- Undis- Distribu-Distribu-
Income Tax tributedtributed tionb lion
1946/479s Od=45%
1947/489s Od=45 25% 10% 61% 50.5%
1948/499s Od=45 25 10 61 50.5
1949/509s Od=45 30 10 64 50.5
1950/519s Od=45 30 10 64 50.5
1951/529s Od=47.5 50 10 73 50.75
1952/539s Od=47.5 22.5 2.5 64 50.0
1953/549s Od=45 22.5 2.5 61 47.5
1954/559s Od=45 22.5 2.5 61 47.5
1955/568s 6d=42.5 27.5 2.5 62 45.0
1956/578s 6d=42.5 30 3 63 45.5




1959/607s 9d=38.75 10 48.75
1960/617s 9d=38.75 12.5 51.25
1961/627s 9d= 38.75 15 53.75
1962/637s 9d=38.75 15 53.75
SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Commissioners of H.M. Inland Revenue.
The timing of these changes frequently did not coincide with the beginning of
a fiscal year so that the correspondence with the first column is only approximate.
bApproximate.For an exposition of the method by which this is calculated, see
Prest, Public Finance, pp. 164—165.
NOTE: Until January 1, 1952, profits tax liability was a deductible expense for
income tax purposes; since that date, the computation of both taxes has taken no
account of liability for the other.
and this recommendation was carried out in 1958. The chief con-
sideration appears to have been the fact that as undistributed profits
accumulate
each year of a company's life sees an accumulating amount of non-dis-
tribution relief, which will or may ultimately be the source of an addi-
tional tax charge upon the company. (para. 527)V.... —-r.
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This is a serious consideration for companies which have to produce for
their shareholders an annual statement of accounts giving a true picture
of their financial position, and which may feel the need from time to
time to raise or borrow further capital from the outside public. ... Wedo
not feel that we can minimize the seriousness of this. (para. 529)
The RCT considered and rejected various arguments in favor of
retaining the differential; the one of particular interest to us was
dealt with as follows:
The tax is also linked with a longer-term objective of encouraging pro..
ductive investment in the form of ploughed-back profits. Here again its
foundations seem uncertain. It does not encourage companies to plough
back profits, so much as to retain them.... Themere retention of profits
cannot be rated as an economic advantage: on the contrary it would better
serve the public interest that a company should be encouraged to distribute
those profits which it cannot put to fruitful use, in order that there may be
a chance that they may be invested effectively elsewhere. Nor is it advan-
tageous for the economy that the level of dividends should be kept down.
Whatever other considerations bear upon the problem, the market value
of shares in industrial and commercial enterprises is artificially depressed
and an obstacle placed in the way of raising new capital. (para. 536)
Although disagreeing on other grounds11 with the recommended
abolition of the differential, the Minorityl2 did not
disagree with the Majority's view that the artificial encouragement of the
retention of profits by companies is not necessarily an economic advantage.
Beyond a certain point it does not in itself stimulate the rate of capital
formation. ... Itdoes not ensure the best use of the community's savings.
It makes it more difficult for fast expanding firms to raise funds in
the capital market, it strengthens the monopolistic tendencies in the
economy, and it encourages wasteful expenditure on behalf of those firms
who have more money than they can use and who are prevented (by
custom and tradition as well as by the instruments of public control)
from channelling their funds to the most profitable potential use. (Mem-
orandum of Dissent, para. 103)
This unexpected identity of view does not imply that the change
was regarded as uncontroversiaLls however, even if we restrict our
11Theimportant role played by the differential in curtailing inflationary
pressure, and a host of issues concerned with the tax treatment of capital
gains. See also N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, pp. 1.41-146.
G. Woodcock, H. L. Bullock, and N. Kaldor.
13See,for instance, T. Balogh, "Differential Profits Tax," Economic Journal,
September 1958, pp. 528-537.404 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
attention to the issues mentioned above and refrain from consid-
ering any of the broader implications of equity, anticyclical policy,
etc.
The case against abolishing the differential has been put most
succinctly by Streeten,14 who argued that a uniform profits tax,
yielding the same revenue as a differential tax, would lead to an in-
crease in profit distributions, and since part of the increased profit
distribution would surely be spent on consumption, total savings
would inevitably decline. Moreover, he did not believe that this
would be offset by an improvement in the allocation of savings:
The view that distributed profits are invested more effectively rests on
two unwarranted assumptions: first, that shareholders are better judges
of investment opportunities than company directors; secondly, that the
capital market is perfect. ... Infact, directors of multi-product firms are
normally in a better position to grasp the opportunities and risks of
embarking on improved and new products than shareholders and their
advisers, even if these are large financial institutions. Even if companies
do not use their profits to branch out into new lines, they buy govern-
ment securities and thus set funds free for investment by others. But more
important ...isthe fact that the large companies which tend to benefit
from the favoured treatment of retained profits, would also have the
greater attraction for the shareholders' money in the capital market, only
there would be less of it.
Before examining in more detail those issues on which statistical
material can be brought to bear, let us first consider two opposing
views on the efficacy of market decision-making.
The most obvious heads of the argument seem to be the importance one
attaches to the freedom of choice of the ultimate owners of capital, one's
views about their comparative ability to judge the most profitable outlets
for capital (including the outlet of holding it in cash form rather than
financing capital formation) and the respectivecosts of working the
machinery of the capital market and self-financing. ... Herewe shall be
completely Draconian and simply state that we think the balance of the
argument is quite clearly on the side of market decisions. The strongest
apparent argument against this is... thatthe capital market machinery
is likely to be more expensive to operate than self-financing, and particu-
larly so for the smalisize firms. But this...pointsto the need for
P. Streeten, "Tax Policy for Investment," Revista di Diritto Finanziario e
Scienza delle Finanze, Vol. XIX, 1960, pp. 135-35.Great Britain 405
improvingthe machinery of the capital market rather than cutting down
the flow of funds to it.15
But there are other imperfections in the capital market which are
relevant here. "One is the source and channels of information in
the system and the location of informed opinion. Another is the
efficiency of the market mechanism under 'load,' i.e. how the num-
ber of decisions affects its behaviour. And another is the peculiar
distortions to which the market is prone—mainly because of the na-
ture and numbers of individual shareholders." Wright goes on to
point out that:
1. Since a full appraisal of all projects is impossible, the best that most
potential shareholders can hope for are recommendations from the press
or other financial advisers;
2. Since property prospects are more calculable than those of manu-
facturing industry, the market shows a distinct bias in favour of invest-
ment in real estate;
3. As the number of transactions increases, the quality of advice deteri-
orates and decisions are more likely to be superficially based;
4. Speculative activity will be a distorting influence, and there is no
objective basis for distinguishing between "informed risktaking" and
"uninformed gambling."le
It is, therefore, not all clear where the balance of advantage lies.
C. The Effects in Practice
It is almost invariably a vain hope in economics to. expect confron-
tation with available statistical evidence to settle any argument con-
clusively. The best that one can hope for is a tentative lead that
one line of argument seems more plausible than another. This
seems to be the situation here. The issues we have to try to resolve
are: Has the substitution of a uniform profits tax for a differential
one with approximately the same yield (1) caused a reduction in the
volume of saving;(2)affected access to finance differently for
different types of firms; (3) influenced the amount and composition
of real private capital formation?
Prest, Public Finance, p.
F. Wright, "The Capital Market and the Finance of Industry," in Wors-
wick and Ady, The British Economy, p. 491.- -.. —
406 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
The first and least disputable fact is that, since the change .in the
structure of the profits tax in 1958, the proportion of profit distrib-
uted has increased sharply. This is clearly so, whether one takes all
nonfinancial companies (Table 2) or only those quoted on the stock
exchange (Table S), and there can be little doubt that this is more
than a coincidence. As to the proportion of profits retained, for all
nonfinancial companies the figure for 1961 was the lowest since
1952 (in which year taxation accounted for twice as much income as
did profit distributions, whereas in 1961 profit distributions ac-
counted for slightly more income than did taxation). For the quoted
companies the proportion has alsofallen, but not nearly so
dramatically.17 This suggests that the greatest increases in distribu-
tions in the corporate sector have occurred among the unquoted
private companies.
But this fall in corporate saving has been more than offset by the
spectacular increase that has occurred in personal savings (including
the gross saving of unincorporated businesses, i.e., before providing
for depreciation and stock appreciation), from around 5 per cent of
personal incomes between 1956 and 1959 to nearly 7 per cent in
1960 and 9 per cent in 1961.18 It remains a matter of speculation
how far the increased personal savings have been made directly
available to the corporate sector, but it is evident that the increase
in personal savings is both absolutely and proportionately much
greater than the increase in incomes arising from dividends, inter-
est, and rents. Thus, whatever the reasons for the increase in per-
sonal savings, the increased profit distributions cannot have been
the main source, although they may have had an incentive effect.
The fact that the decline in corporate savings has been more than
offset by an upsurge in personal savings does not in itself disprove
Streeten's argument. All that one can say is that, for whatever rea-
son, there has been no dearth of savings since the abolition of the
differential profits tax.
But so far we have been dealing only in aggregates, and we must
and Finance of Quoted Companies, 1949-1960," Economic Trends,
April 1962.
19See National Income and Expenditure, 1%2, London, 1962, Tables 2 and
25. Even allowing for the notorious unreliability of estimates of personal sav-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































now turn to the second issue posed at the beginning of this section
—the availability of finance for different types of firms. It is clear
from Table 4 that companies as a group have been saving substan-
tially larger sums than they needed to finance gross fixed capital
formation at home, and between 1952 and 1959 more even than they
needed to finance changes in the value of stocks (inventories) as
well. There has, however, been a marked decline in both these sav-
ings-to-investment ratios from 1959 on. Unfortunately, the data for
quoted companies are not strictly comparable with that for all com-
panies, but it does show (Table 3) a similar decline in the impor-
tance of self-financing in relation to gross physical investment. It is
not unusual, of course, for savings-to-investment ratios to fall during
periods of high investment, but it is unusual for the savings-to-in-
come ratio to fall at such times, and still more unusual for the abso-
lute level of internally generated savings to fall.
The reaction of the quoted companies has been to go to the mar-
ket for the extra funds needed for purchases of tangible fixed assets,
and to rely on short-term credit to finance increases in inventories
(Table 5).19Itis not so clear what the sources of finance have been
for the unquoted private companies and unincorporated businesses.
Indeed, our knowledge of this segment of the economy is sparse
generally. The 1956 Oxford Survey of Small Businesses, which cov-
ered mainly private companies with less than 500 employees, many
of which were "family firms," indicated that (between 1954 and
1956 at any rate)
Out of a relatively small profit ... privatecompanies save a larger pro-
portion than do public companies. They pay rather less tax and distribute
smaller dividends. ... Thesetwo characteristics are largely accounted for
by the fact that in small, director-controlled firms, a higher proportion of
profits is paid out as directors' remuneration....
Private companies and unincorporated businesses depend very heavily
on short and medium term outside borrowing. They rely a great deal on
finance from the banks. ... Tradecredit is also more important—both as
a source and use of funds ... manysmall firms receive tnore credit than
they give and finance part of their development by these means. Directors'
loans ... arefrequently used ... andalthough in weight they are rarely
important they are frequently of great strategic significance. Hire purchase
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Within the sample, the heaviest dependence on short and medium term
borrowing was in the smaller, rapidly growing firms.
In the light of all this, it seems surprising that (by inference) re-
cently profit distributions appear to have increased more markedly
among this group than among the public companies. If this is so
(and it is by no means established), the clue may lie in two aspects
of the problem which cannot be ignored any longer, namely, the
wide variations in behavior between large and small firms, and be-
tween growing firms and static or declining ones, within each of the
groups we have so far been considering.
For the quoted public companies, the situation between 1949 and
1953 has been intensively analyzed in B. Tew and R. F. Henderson's
Studies in Company Finance.21 Their findings were: (1) the larger
firms saved a slightly higher, and distributed a slightly lower, pro-
portion of their profits than did the smaller ones; (2) growing firms
saved rather more, and distributed distinctly less, of their profits
than did the static ones; (3) self-financing declined in relation to ex-
penditure on tangible fixed assets both as size increased and as the
rate of growth increased, but depreciation allowances constituted a
much greater element in the savings of static firms than in growing
ones; and (4) new loan and share capital was relatively more impor-
tant as a source of funds for the large firms than for the small ones,
but the differences were much greater between the static and the
growing firms. Since the larger firms grew more rapidly than the
smaller firms, the growth and the size differences are partly interre-
lated.
From an analysis of the accounts of those public companies ana-
lyzed by the Board of Trade in Company Assets, Income and Fi-
nance, 1960,22 for which data for all three years 1958-60 were avail-
A. Bates, The Financing of Small Business, London, 1964,pp.31-32. The
findings of the Small Business Survey have been reported in the following: H. F.
Lydall, Impact of the Credit Squeeze on Small and Medium-Sized Manu-
facturing Firms," Economic Journal, September 1957; J. A. Bates, "The Fi-
nance of Small Business," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Sta-
tistics, May 1958; H. F. Lydall, "The Growth of Manufacturing Firms," Bulk-
tin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, May 1959.
21Cambridge,1959, Tables A-i and A-3, pp. 269 and 272-2'73.
22London, 1962. Unfortunately, it has not been possible in the time available to
pursue this analysis as far aswould have wished. For the results presented here, IGreat Britain 413
able, the following preliminary conclusions have emerged: First, a
markedly higher proportion of larger companies has raised new
capital than of the smaller ones (see Table 6, Part A). Second, the
percentage share of self-financing in the increase in net assets is
negatively correlated with the proportionate increase in net assets
during this period, both for the larger companies (with net assets of
at least £0.5 million) and for the smaller ones (net assets under
million).Both of these negative correlations are significant at
the 5 per cent level (see Tables 7 and 8) and also for most industry
groups when taken out and analyzed separately. This lends support
to the contention that the greater the rate of growth, the smaller
the role of self-finance in financing that growth.
Third, as the obverse of this, the greater the rate of increase in
net assets, the larger the proportion of companies which have been
net issuers of new capital (see Table 6, Part B). Moreover, for these
companies the percentage share of the actual amount of new capital
in the increase in net assets is positively correlated with the propor-
tionate increase in net assets (see Tables 7 and 8),. though in the case
ofthesmaller companies,thecorrelationisnotstatistically
significant.23 We may therefore say that, for the larger firms at least,
the greater the rate of growth, the greater the role of new capital.
Fourth, there is a strong and statistically significant negative cor-
relation between the percentage share of new capital in the increase
in net assets and the income-to-asset ratio, for both the larger and
the smaller companies (Tables 7 and 8). In other words, the lower
the rate of return on capital employed, the larger the role of new
capital as a source of finance.
Fifth, among the firms which did offer new issues, there is no sta-
tistically discernible correlation between the percentage share of new
capital in the increase in net assets and the actual size of net assets,
either for the larger or the smaller firms.24 Thus although size ap-
am indebted to the Board of Trade for permission to use the data tapes con-
taining the standardized accounting material prepared for their published an-
alysis, and to my colleague in the Mathematics Department at Exeter Univer-
sity, Brian Housley, who prepared and ran the programs by which the data
were processed.
+.056 as against ± .225 for significance at the 5 per cent level.
24 For the eighty smaller companies the correlation coefficient is—.005,and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financing of Increase in Net Assets by Large Quoted Companies
Coefficient ofCoefficient of Correlation
Correlation Between Percentage
Between Share of New
Percentage Capital in
Share of Increase in
Self-Financing Net Assets and
in Increase in
Net Assets and IncreaseIncome-to-
Increase in inNet Asset
Industry Net Assets Assets Ratio
21. Food _.389* +.229 _.414*
23. Drink —537* +.429* —.249
26. Chemicals _.576* +.542* —.097
31. Metal Manuf. _.253* +.261 —.050
33.Nonelectr, eng. —.451* + .060 —•359*
36. Electr. eng. —.371* + .042 —- 590*
38. Vehicles —.452* + .352 —.249
Other metal goods _.490* +.625* —.360
41. Textiles —.153* +.340* _.364*
46.Bricks, pottery, etc. —.318* + .429* —.172
48.Paper, printing, etc. — + •447* —.440*
50. Construction —.417* + .281 —.203
81.Wholesale distrib. —.404* + •455* —.261
82.Retail distrib. —.372* + .089 —.450*
88. Misc. services —.290* + —.097
21—24. Food, drink, tobacco —•375* + .327* —.250*
31—39. Metal manuf. and
engineering _.370* +.157*_354*
41—49. Other manuf. _.115* +.229* _.291*
21—49.All manuf. _.168* +.184*
50—88. Construction, distrib.
and services —.348* + .250* —.318*
21—88. All industries _.184* +.200* _.306*
No. of companies analyzed 1 673a 646b 648°
NOTE: Figures for individual industries are given only where at least twenty
observations are available. Excluded industries are, however, included in the rele-
vant aggregates lower in the table. For coverage, definitions, and classification by
industry, see Company Assets, Income and Finance, 1950, pp. iii—vi.
a Excludes 155 companies with no increase in net assets.
b Excludes 155 companies with no increase in net assets, and, of the remainder,
253 with negative new capital and 774 with zero new capital.
°Excludes12 companies with negative or zero income, 313 with net new capital
negative, 845 with zero net new capital, and, of the remainder, 10 with no increase
innet assets.
* Significant at the 5 per cent level.Great Britain 417
TABLE8
Financing of Increase in Net Assets by Small Quoted Companies
Coefficient of
Correlation Coefficient of Correlation
Between Between Percentage
Percentage Share of New
Share of Capital in
Self-Financing Increase in




Industry Assets Assets Ratio
21. Food _.462*
26. Chemicals —.440
33. Nonelect. Eng. —.329*
39. Other metal goods —.246
41. Textiles —545*
46. Bricks, pottery, etc. —.464*
48.Paper, printing, etc. —.257
49.Other manuf. _.601*
81. Wholesale distrib. —.217
82.Retail distrib. —.300
88. Misc. services —.323
21—24.Food, drink, tobacco —•455*
3 1—39. Metal manuf. and
engineering —.233* + .03! —.632*
41—49. Other manuf. —.284*
21—49. All manuf. __.257* +.167 _•395*
50—88. Construction, distrib.,
and services —.235* + .019 —.357
21—88.All industries _.172* +.056 —.376k
No. of companies analyzed 79abo
Noit:Figures for individual industries are given only where at least twenty
observations are available. Excluded industries are, however, included in the
relevant aggregates lower in the table. For coverage, see Company Asseis, Income
and Finance, 1950, pp. iii-vi.
aExcludes167 companies with no increase in net assets.
bOfthose companies with a positive increase in net assets, excludes 49 with
negative new capital, and 372 with zero net capital.
oOfthose companies with a positive increase in net assets and positive net new
capital, excludes I with negative income.
*Significantat the 5 per cent level.418 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
pears to be a relevant factor in determining whether new capital is
issued or not, it does not seem to affect the relative role of new cap-
ital in financing growth among those companies which do go to the
market. For the smaller private firms the picture which emerges is
summed up by Bates thus: "Self-financed firms tend on the whole
to be the larger, slower growing, highly liquid firms in the sam-
ple, and are more likely to be family firms. Inasmuch as conclusions
can be drawn from this data, the likelihood is therefore that self-
financing in this sense is indicative of a cautious and rather static
type of firm."25
There is some corroboration for this in the finding that, for 85
per cent of the firms, finance was not the effective constraint2o al-
though it appears to be relatively more important for the growing
firms than for the Similarly, efforts to overcome financial
difficulties often seem to have been almost perfunctory.28
A similar phenomenon has also been noted among public quoted
companies. Barna concluded from his investigation of firms in the
electrical industry and in food processing that, although his inquiry
"was in fact directed to public companies and a few ambitious pri-
vate companies, and excluded the type of small firm uninterested
in growth,"29 he nevertheless found that:
The amounts of liquid resources and of bank borrowing ... appearto
reflect the character of the firm rather than its economic position. Per-
sistent high liquidity may indicate conservative management. Firms with
high liquidity may have grown slowly, because of unwillingness or in-
capacity of management. All in all it appears that firms which want to
grow and had the ability to make a profit, also had the ability or oppor-
tunity to raise finance ... amanagement which has proved able in other
respects also proved ingenious in raising money. ..
Bates,Financing of Small Business, p. 57. He qualifies this conclusion in those
cases where, because of the "lumpiness" of investment in relation to savings,
funds are being accumulated in anticipation of some major capital outlays.
SeeLydall in Bulletin of the Oxford University Institttte of Statistics, May
1959.
Seealso A. •S.Mackintosh, The Development of Firms, Cambridge. 1965,
esp. Chap. V.
See Bates, Financing of Small Business.
T. Barna, Investment and Growth PoliciesinBritish Industrial Firms,
N.I.E.S.R. Occasional Paper XX,London,1962. p. 38.
50lbid., p. 20.Great Britain 419
Carter and Williams31 reached similar conclusions:
Out of 138 firms for which information exists, lack of finance was a
definite hindrance ...innineteen... However,of the nineteen
ten were technically very progressive, and thirteen were in fact rapidly
expanding, which suggests that the problem. affects some of those who
might be leaders in the application of science and technology. Yet even
among the nineteen the difficulty was not always that the money could not
be obtained, but that the firm would not stomach the conditions for
obtaining it.
It does, therefore, seem unlikely that 'any firm "hell-bent on
growth" would have been led, by the abolition of the differential
profits tax, to increase its profit distributions, unless it saw such in-
creased distributions as a sprat to catch a mackerel, i.e., unless it
contemplated going to the market for funds.32 Thus the (inferen-
tially) increased profit distributions among private firms are pre-
sumably concentrated among the static firms with excess liquidity.
Whether these liquid funds, when distributed, are more likely to
find their way via the capital market into the hands of more go-
ahead firms than would have been the case otherwise is a moot
point.
This brings us to the third of the questions posed earlier—the ex-
tent and nature of worthwhile physical investment that is frustrated
by sheer inability to obtain financing. From the evidence considered
thus far, it appears unlikely that this could have been a real prob-
lem in most cases. The most experienced of British authorities in
this field recently observed; "If it be asked where, in the range of
size and age, the difficulty is mostly located, it may be suggested
that it is experienced most of all in two places—the new and rapidly
growing venture, which is probably quite small—a net worth of per-
haps £5,000 to £20,000—and the £ 150,000 to £250,000 company
which needs additional resources which are heavy in relation to its
C. F. Carter and B. R. Williams, industry and Technical Progress, London,
1957, p. 140.
The abolition of the differential may, however, have shifted the balance of
power between management and shareholders in profit distribution. Carter and
Williams, for instance, report that "One company was prepared to admit to
us that it had no developments held up for lack of finance, and that the bit-
ter complaints about high taxation in its annual report were meant to justify
to the shareholders a failure to increase the dividend" (ibid., p. 148).420 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
net worth."38 Similarly, Carter and Williams reported that their in-
quiries indicated that in the view of potential lenders "the main
problem is ...thelack of credit-worthy borrowers with good ideas
awaiting exploitation" except that "a few classes of borrower may
find unreasonable difficulty, in particular: (a) those wanting sums
between, say, £10,000 and £ 30,000 who may have difficulty in get-
ting so much from a bank or private lenders, and yet be too small
to be of much interest to the City institutions; (b) those wanting
money for three to seven years, i.e. for a period rather long for a
bank loan, but too short to be counted as 'permanent' finance."34
Thus in spite of the setting up of special organizations to make
capital available to the smaller, newer, and more rapidly growing
firms, acute financial difficulties do seem to remain for a very small
minority, although one suspects that the importance of this has
been greatly exaggerated.
Whatever the terms of borrowing, thereislikely to be a fringe of
unsatisfied borrowers whose optimism about their own projects is not fully
shared by potential lenders. Indeed, for the health of the economic system
it is desirable that there should always be a queue of projects that can
be undertaken when resources become available. The fact that the visible
members of the queue are mostly small firms does not prove that there
is a bias against them. For in large firms the central management will
already have sorted out the positive proposals produced from below, and
the excess demand for finance will be felt inside and not outside the
firm."
At this point, then, we should turn to the role of depreciation a!-
lowances, and especially initial allowances and investment allow-
ances, since these confer their benefits specifically upon those firms
that are undertaking physical investment and take no account of
"creditworthiness," the size or age of the firm, or its financial Struc-
ture, although they do depend for their effectiveness upon there
being sufficient taxable profits against which they can be set.
Lord Piercy (Chairman of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corpo-
ration) in a Memorandum submitted to the Radcliffe Committee on the Work-
ing of the Monetary System, published in Principal Memoranda of Evidence,
London, 1960, Vol. 3, p. 195.
Industry and Technical Progress, pp. 144-145.
Wright in Worswick and Ady, The British Economy, p. 499.Great Britain 421
III. CAPITAL ALLOWANCES
A. The Law
In the tax treatment of capital expenditures, both incorporated
and unincorporated business are treated alike. Actual capital ex-
penditures (apart from repairs and maintenance) are not a deducti-
ble expense for tax purposes.36 In their place, a depreciation allow-
ance is granted, which is based on the original cost of the asset and
its estimated life and calculated normally by the reducing-balance
method, although for certain classes of asset the straight-line meth-
od is used.37 Such allowances are granted for industrial (but not
commercial) buildings, plant and machinery, vehicles, ships, scien-
tific research assets, patents, and mineral deposits worked abroad.
The allowance is granted in full in the fiscal year in which the asset
is brought into use and ceases when the original cost of the asset has
been exhausted or when it is disposed of, whichever is earlier. If the
realization price obtained for an asset exceeds its written-down value
for tax purposes, the excess depreciation allowances previously
granted are recovered by the imposition of a "balancing charge." If
the realization price is lower than the written-down value for tax
purposes, the deficiency in depreciation allowances is made good by
the grant of a "balancing allowance." Allowances may be claimed
for tax purposes irrespective of the depreciation provisions (if any)
that are made in the commercial accounts of the business. If depre-
Except for certain classes of assets which are dealt with on a "renewals"
basis, e.g., cutlery in the catering trades or loose tools in manufacturing, which
are written off against revenue as replaced.
In general, the basic allowances for wear and tear are determined by find-
ing the percentage which, if applied annually by the reducing-balance method,
would reduce the value of the asset to one-tenth of its original cost over its
estimated life. These rates may, however, be adjusted by negotiation in cases
where exceptional wear and tear can be shown. In all cases, the actual allow-
ances for wear and tear is of the "basic"(or negotiated) rate. In
some cases (e.g., ships) the straight-line method is used, in which case the basic
rate is nine-tenths of the reciprocal of the estimated life of the asset. As be-
fore, this is subject to renegotiation, and the actual rate is obtained by mul-
tiplying the "basic" rate by five-fourths..—. ,—V.. - -——, W.—
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TABLE 9
Specimen Rates of Wear and Tear Allowancesa
(per cent)
Motor cars and lorries 20 Iron and steel machinery
Accounting machines 10 and plant 7.5
Electric furnaces 12.5 Light metal castings
Electric motors, dynamos, machinery and plant 10
etc. 7.5 Precision machinery or
Engines, boilers, and plant 125
shafting 5 Printing and binding
Clothing processing machines 7.5
machinery 10 Plastics manufacture,
Drop forging machinery machinery and plant:
and plant 7.5 Single-shift working 10
Steam power plant and Double-shift working 12.5
shafting 5 Treble-shift working 15
Sawmilling machinery
and plant 10
SouRcE: Income Tax Wear and Tear Allowances for Machinery or Plant—List of
Percentage Rates, London, 1953.
a"Basic"percentage rates applies under the reducing-balance method up to
November 1962.
ciation allowances for tax purposes cannot be fully utilized in any
year because of insufficiency of taxable profits, they can be carried
forward and offset against future profits without any time limit.
Specimen rates of "wear and tear" allowances, in force until No-
vember 1962, on various types of plant and machinery are presented
in Table 9. Substantial increases in these rates took effect after No-
vember 1962.
In addition to the above-mentioned annual allowances on build-
ings and wear and tear allowances .on plant and machinery, there
are two further provisions—the initial allowance and the invest-
ment allowance—both of which accelerate the normal depreciation
allowance for tax purposes for the classes of assets which qualify for
them. Under the initial allowance, a firm may claim a specified
extra proportion of the cost of certain classes of assets in the first
year, but this supplementary allowance is deducted from the writ-
ten-down value for tax purposes, and so reduces the sum on which•-', r —-r - -. —. V —— —
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subsequent depreciation allowances are calculated. The sum of the
initial allowance and the ordinary depreciation allowances may not
exceed the original cost of the asset. The investment allowance, on
the other hand, also permits a firm to claim a specified extra pro-
portion of the cost of certain classes of assets in the first year, but
this supplementary allowance is not taken into account in the cal-
culation of subsequent depreciation allowances. It is, therefore, pos-
sible with investment allowances to write off for tax purposes a sum
greater than the original cost of the asset. The various rates at
which initial and investment allowances have been granted, and the
classes of assets affected, are presented in Table 10).
B. Liquidity Aspects
Capital allowances play a dual role in relation to investment de-
cisions. They constitute a means by which part of the profits of a
firm accrues tax free, thus enhancing the prospective rate of return
on an investment. Consideration of this profitability aspect will be
deferred until Section C below. Here we shall consider depreciation
allowances as a source of funds, exempt from taxation, available for
financing current investment.
A great deal of the dispute about the liquidity aspect of deprecia-
tion allowances has been concerned with their alleged inadequacy
as a source of funds to finance replacement of capital during a pe-
riod of rising prices. Specifically, it is adherence to original cost as
the basis for the calculation that is usually attacked, the argument
being that the need to set aside additional (taxed) funds has re-
tarded the rate of re-equipment and modernization and, in extreme
cases, led to "erosion of capital." In their Final Report, the RCT
rejected these assertions on two broad grounds: First, they felt
"unable to accept the statistical exercises as establishing that over a
specified period industrial capital has been eroded by taxation," al-
though they did think it probable that a shortage of financial re-
sources would be "of increasing weight in the years ahead."38 Sec-
ondly, accepting the fact that depreciation funds accumulated on
the basis of historical costs would not be adequate to finance re-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0426 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
placement expenditures when prices are rising, the RCT observed
that "it does not follow from this that a company will not be in a
position to effect the replacement without going outside for new
money. That will depend on. ..(a)the level of tax, (b) the amount
of the company's past reserves, (c) the amount of profits currently
retained, itself partly dependent on such matters as the company's
capital structure and its past distribution Moreover, the
RCT considered that, although it was not their prime purpose, the
initial and investment allowances do "incidentally alleviate the po-
sition of the trader who faces the problem of replacement at a time
of inflation, so far as his problem is concerned with the kind of
asset that is covered by the The difficulty here, of
course, is that the allowances are not available for all classes of as-
sets, nor at all times on those classes of assets for which they are
usually granted (see Table 10).
A later official inquiry into this same problem found that, during
the period 1950-56, ordinary depreciation allowances granted for
tax purposes amounted to 72 per cent of estimated capital con-
sumption. Had these allowances been adjusted to the assumption
that there had been no initial allowances, the proportion would
have risen to 85 per cent, while if initial and investment allowances
were taken into account, total tax allowances for depreciation ex-
ceeded estimated capital consumption by about 10 per Using
still more recent official figures (Table 11) it appears that these pro-
portions have risen in recent years.
Once more, of course, the broad aggregates conceal considerable
variations from one type of firm to another and also between indus-
tries. Part of the latter variations are caused by the differences in
treatment accorded to different types of assets. Nonindustrial build-
ings are the most clear-cut example, since they qualify for no depre-
ciation allowances of any kind whatever.
In Section TIC above we considered the actual depreciation provi-
sions made by firms in their own accounts and treated such provi-
sions as part of the firms' gross saving or self-financing. Here we
Ibid., para. 341.
40Ibid.,para. 371.
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TABLE 12
Statutory Depreciation Allowances, in Relation to
Gross True Income for Tax Purposes
(Schedule D Only)
Capital Allowances
Gross True Capital as Per Cent of
Income Allowances Gross True Income
Assess-
ments Corn- Corn.- Coin-
Made inPersonspanies Personspanies Personspanies
Fiscal
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1950/51 1058 1791 93 407 8.822.7
1951/52 1110 2125 103 507 9.3 23.9
1952/53 1165 2451 107 591 9.2 24.1
1953/54 1199 2423 84 473 7.0 19.5
1954/55 1266 2617 96 503 7.6 19.2
1955/56 1333 2980 109 581 8.2 19.5
1956/57 1401 3320 129 673 9.2 20.3
1957/58 1468 3285 137 767 9.3 23.3
1958/59 1557 3330 143 856 9.225.7
1959/60 1617 3470 166 944 10.327.2
1960/61 1696 3787 186 1050 11.0 27.7
SouRcE:AnnualReportsof the Commissioners of H.M. Inland Revenue. Gross
true income for tax purposes is the aggregate income brought under the review of the
Inland Revenue Department, after allowance has been made for losses and deduc-
tion of certain items, such as interest payments, national insurance contributions,
management expenses, etc., but before deduction of allowances for repairs and
capital allowances.
need to look instead at the capital allowances granted for tax pur-
poses, in relation to both taxable income and gross capital expendi-
tures.
Taking the relationship to taxable income first, Table 12 shows
quite clearly that since 1954/55 the proportion of income accruing
tax-free in this way has been increasing, although the absolute level
of this proportion is much smaller for unincorporated than for in-
corporated businesses. The full range of variations between indus-
try groups in the fiscal year 1960/61 is displayed in Table 18. FromTABLE 13
Statutory Depreciation Allowances in Relation to Gross True Income
Assessed for Tax Purposes, in 1960—67, by Trade Groupa
Capital
Allowances as
Gross True Capital Per Cent of
Income Allowances Gross True
(em) (sm) Income
PC&LA PC&LA PC&LA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extractiv&' 272 53 77 25 28.347.2
Food,drink, and
tobacco 16 333 3 75 16.6 22.5
Chemicalsand
allied trades 1 292 103 25.035.3
Iron and steel 1 206 87 11 .1 42.2
Nonferrous metals 1 58 18 16.731.0
Electrical Eng. and
electric goods 4 165 1 50 12.230.3
Vehicles 3 189 1 58 26.930.7
Other engineeringd 13 314 2 76 13.624.2
Other metal goods 9 107 1 26 9.024.3
Textiles, leather,
and clothing 18 232 1 63 7.627.2
Other manu-
facturing 23 318 3 94 11.929.6
Buildingand
contract. 132 120 12 40 9.1 33.3
Shipping 105 98 75.0 93.3
Othertransport
and comm.
(exel. RR) 53 122 18 73 34.059.8
Wholesaledistrib. 54 266 7 57 12.3 21 .4
Retail distrib. 346 271 30 68 8.7 25.1
Ins. bkg. finance 51 78 2 11 3.3 14.1
Professional services289 10 15 2 5.2 19.4
Otherservicese 223 169 15 37 6.7 21.9
1,6964,016 186 1,093 11.027.2
AnnualReports ofCommissioneis of H.M. Inland Revenue.
P =persons.
C& LA =companiesand local authorities.
aExcludingnationalized industries.





Including undertakings abroad not included above.-
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this it is clear that even in relatively labor-intensive activities like
retail distribution, in which buildings do not qualify for capital al-
lowances, about a fifth of income can be obtained tax-free through
statutory depreciation allowances, while in the shipping industry
the major portion of income becomes exempt from tax in this way.
Turning to the relationship between statutory depreciation al-
lowances and gross fixed capital formation (excluding
Table 14 shows that since 1951 for companies the proportion has
usually fallen between about 60 and 70 per cent, and for persons
between 45 and 65 per cent. The fluctuations have been almost en-
tirely due to the variations in initial and investment allowances, the
impact of the other allowances being relatively stable. As one might
expect, changes in gross fixed capital formation from year to year
have been greater than changes in allowances, so that in times of
sharply rising investment the proportion has fallen, while a fall in
investment has raised the proportion. A corollary of this is that rap-
idly growing, high-investment industries like chemicals can only ob-
tain about 50 per cent of the funds they need from tax-exempt
depreciation allowances, while relatively static industries like tex-
tiles, leather, and clothing get 70 or 80 per cent in this way.
It will be recalled from the data on public quoted companies an-
alyzed earlier that the lower the income-to-asset ratio, the greater
the rate of growth of net assets, and (with some qualifications) the
larger the company, then the greater will be the role of new capital.
If we look now at the self-financing of these same companies, as
measured by its ratio to income (instead of to the increase in net as-
sets), then for the larger firms we find the following correlations for
that ratio (Table 15):
1. There is no significant over-all correlation with size (as mea-
sured by the logarithm of net assets), although some of the industry
groups do have statistically significant correlation coefficients, all of
which are positive:
2. There is a barely significant negative correlation with the in-
come-to-assetratio,although some oftheindustries show a
significant positive correlation.
3. There is no significant over-all correlation with the percentage
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TABLE 15










Net Asset in Increase in
Industry Assets Ratio Net Assets
21. Food —.109 _.323* —.044
23. Drink +.104 +134 —.292
26. Chemicals + .198 —.290* —397*
31. Metal Manuf. +.415* _.220* —.350
33. Nonelectr. eng. +.135 —.102 +.602*
36. Electr. eng. + .060 —.088 + .004
38. Vehicles +.324* +.249* —.313
39.Other metal goods +.001 —.171 _•549*
41. Textiles + .009 + .034 —.276
46.Bricks, pottery, etc. —.067 —.397* + .223
48.Paper, printing, etc. + .022 —.307* —.172
50.Construction +.175 _.302* —.428
81. Wholesale distrib. + .229* +.186* —.034
82.Retail distrib. —.084 +.151 —.177
88. Misc. services + .232* + .247* —.297
21—24. Food, drink, tobacco —.074 —.189* —149
31—39. Metal manuf. and
engineering +.204* _.103* +.153*
41—49. Other manuf. + .049 +.061 —.028
21—49. AllmanuL + .003 —.051 + .030
50—88.Construction, distrib.,
and services + .098* +.118* —.216*
21—88. All industries + .013 —.038* —.075
No. of companies analyzed 648b
Figures for individual industries are given only where at least twenty
observations are available. The excluded industries are, however, included in the
aggregated groups in the last six lines. For coverage, definitions, and classification
byindustry, see CompanyAssets, Income and Finance 1960, pp. iii—vi.
s Excludes12 companies with negative or zero income.
b Excludes 313 companies with negative net new capital, 845 with zero new
capital, and, of the remainder, 10 with no increase innetassets.
*Significantat the 5 per cent level.Great Britain 433
dustries which show a significant correlation, some are negative and
some positive. Thus, for the larger companies, the degree of profit
retention does not seem to vary systematically with any of these
variables.
The story is much the same for the smaller companies (Table 16).
There is a significant, but small, positive correlation between size
and the ratio of self-financing to income, and between this ratio
and the income-to-asset ratio. This latter result is interesting since
the sign of the coefficient is the opposite of that for the larger com-
panies. Again, however, wide variations exist from industry to in-
dustry, and without further detailed analysis it would be dangerous
to give this too much weight.42 Nor does there seem to be much evi-
dence supporting the hypothesis that the firms which rely most on
new capital (as measured by the percentage share of new capital in
the increase in net assets) are those which are also plowing back the
most (i.e., have the highest ratio of self-financing to income). For
the smaller companies, this latter correlation coefficient is positive
but not statistically significant, just as it was negative but not sta-
tistically significant for the larger companies.
Initial allowances are usually characterized in their effects as "an
interest-free loan," and investment allowances as "a concealed subsi-
dy." The RCT in its Final Report regarded initial allowances as
not merely a loan, because (1) "the remission given by the Revenue
is reclaimable only against future tax," (2) "the allowance is avail-
able to a business...regardlessof its borrowing powers," and (3) it
is "something more than temporary accommodation where the busi-
ness that receives it is a continuing concern," for, as long as they are
in force, "the allowances for new expenditure, as they come in, con-
stitutea revolving credit inthe taxpayer's account with the
Or, as Prest puts the matter, rather more forcefully,
initial allowances constitute "a free gift if insufficient income is
earned to repay them, a larger gift if the business continues to
grow, and a growing gift if the business grows at an increasing
Investment allowances are much more obviously an outright
42 isnot the only unfinished part of this work, for there is also the re-
lationship between self-finance as a percentage of income and the rate of in.
crease of net assets to be investigated.
Para. 428.
Public Finance, p. 818.434 ForeignTax Policies and Economic Growth
TABLE 16







Log of Income-to-of New Capital
Net Asset in Increase in
Industry Assets Ratio Net Assets
21. Food +.406* —.109
26. Chemicals +.172 +.370
31. Metalmanuf. — .322 —.384
33. None!ectr. eng. — .108 + .315*
39.Othermetal goods +.217 —.039
41. Textiles +.159 —.030
46. Bricks, pottery,etc. — .292 +. 119
48.Paper, printing,etc. + .229 —.658*
49.Othermanuf. + .008 —.036
81. Wholesale distrib. +.179 + .144
82.Retaildistrib. + .399 + .639 *
88. Misc.services +.119 +.091







+ .084 — .048
+ . 546 *







+ .092* + .079*
—.077
+ .076
No. ofcompanies analyzed 626a 626a 79b
Nom: Figures for individual industries are given only where at least twenty ob-
servations are available. Excluded industries are, however, included in the rele-
vant aggregates lower in the table. For coverage, definitions, and classification by
industry, see Company Assets, Income and Finance, 1960,pp.iii—vi.
Excludes 42 companies with negative or zero income.
bExcludes485 companies with zero new capital, 99 with negative new capital,
and, of the remainder, 1 with zero or negative income.
*Significantat the 5 per cent level.
tax remission, irrecoverable once granted, no matter what the subse-
quent pattern of growth or decline in the firms' fortunes.
Both of these allowances have the advantage of providing the taxGreat Britain 435
relief early in the life of the asset. Even so it is claimed that the re-
lief is not prompt enough, because business taxation in the U.K.
operates on a preceding-year basis,i.e., the trading profits upon
which tax is paid in any fiscal year will be those accruing in the
firm's own accounting year which ended in the preceding fiscal
year.45 This means a delay .of eighteen months or so between the in-
curring of expenditures and the gaining of tax relief, which means
that the liquidity effect of the allowances may be delayed too long
to help a firmina tight spot.
Nevertheless, because of characteristic 2 above, initial (and invest-
ment) allowances might be expected to be particularly valuable to
firms experiencing difficulties in obtaining external finance, and
characteristic 3 would make them especially important to rapidly
growing firms. Unfortunately there is a great dearth of systematic
empirical evidence on this point. The Federation of British Indus-
tries found that out of 1595 firms polled in 1957, 23 per cent said
that, since 1951, investment decisions had been materially affected
by favorable changes in investment and initial allowances, while 14
per cent had been so affected by unfavorable changes, and these
proportions varied little between fiims of different sizes.46 Unfortu-
nately no breakdown was made by growth rates. In an as yet unpub-
lisheci survey of management accounting techniques in southeastern
Hampshire carried out by H. Hart and D. F. Prusmann of South-
ampton University in 1963, it was found that 42 out of 116 re-
spondents giving a definite answer (i.e., 36 per cent) stated that they
had found that investment allowances acted as an inducement to
replace or add to plant. If divisions and branches of firms are ex-
cluded from the analysis, there are 31 out of 91 (34per cent) re-
porting such a response. Breaking these down into size groups, we
find 6 out of 29 (21 per cent) of those employing 21 to 100 people,
17 out of 48 (35 per cent) of those employing 101 to 500, and 8 out
of 14 of those employing over 500 people reporting a positive re-
sponse. Again, no information is available on growth rates. A sur-
vey of factors affecting productivity growth generally, covering 142
businesses in southwest England, recently carried out by D. C. Cor-
Thus profits earned in the accounting year ended on June 30, 1963, will
be the basis for the tax assessment in the fiscal year starting April 6. 1964.
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ner of Exeter University included a section on financial aspects.
This confirmed that the firms which are most susceptible to these
allowances are those which have had difficulty in obtaining finance
and have been deterred by high interest rates (see Table 17, Parts A
and B). Independent firms were more susceptible (24 per cent) than
subsidiaries (15 per cent), while of the independents the larger ones
were more influenced (40 per cent) than the smaller ones (19 per
cent) (Table 17, Part C). The only size and growth indicator avail-
able was the number employed, which, though the pertinent vari-
able in relation to the main purpose of the survey, is not the most
suitable in the context of capital finance. Nevertheless, the growing
firms in each size group were more influenced by the allowances
than were the static or declining ones (39 against 11 per cent).
However, none of these results enables us to establish at all firmly
the relative importance of the liquidity and profitability aspects of
the allowances, and informed observers are divided on this issue.
On one side of the fence we find Dow, who says: "Econometric
analysis suggests that the flow of liquid funds is crucial in determin-
ing the pace of investment. Generally the government has no way
of changing firms' liquidity. But the initial allowance did just that,
and on a considerable scale." To this he adds, in a footnote: "This
general conclusion is perhaps supported by econometric investiga-
tions which tend to show that variations in profits are associated
with variations in investment of about equal magnitude. Profits are
probably chiefly to be regarded as a source of funds, though they
alsogivesomeindicationoftheprofitabilityofthe new
investment. "47
Onthe other side of the fence we find Barna:
The fact that liquidity is not related to growth or, if it is,is inversely
related to it, may help in interpreting the relation of profits to growth.
Profits may be taken to represent either a flow of liquid funds or profit-
ability on capital employed with a suggestion that this profitability will
be maintained in the future. The findings on financial behaviour tend to
support the view that the latter aspect of profits is important.
The most important relationship established here, that beween longer-
47j.C.R. Dow, "The Economic Effects of Monetary Policy," Principal
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TABLE17
Preliminary Results of Survey of 142 Extractive and Manufacturing
Businesses in Southwest England
PART A: RESPONSES TO FAVORABLE CHANGES IN INITIAL AND/OR INVESTMENT
ALLOWANCES COMPARED WITH OTHER FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Responsive to Allowances
Yes(27) No(103)
Projects abandoned and/or postponed be-
cause of high interest rates:
1.Yes 6 15
2.No 21 86
Line I as percent of lines 1+2 22 15
Projects abandoned and/or postponed be-
cause of difficulty in obtaining financing:
3. Yes 11 22
4.No 15 80
Line 3 as per cent of lines 3+4 42 22
Projects abandoned and/or postponed be-
cause of tax changes:
5.Ycs 7 5
6.No 19 96
Line 5 as per cent of lines 5+6 27 5
New plant and equipment requiredto
yield percent per annum:
7.Yes 9 37
8.No 16 60
Line 7 as per cent of lines 7+8 36 38
New plant and equipment required to pay
for itself in so many years:
9. Yes 19 73
1O.No 8 24
Line 9 as per cent of lines 9+ 10 70 75
NOTE: Subtotals may not add to over-all total because relevant information is
not available for particular firms.
(continued)—
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Nom: Excludes all firms not stating response to allowances (12).
Hypotheses
a. The 15 firms affected by both interest and finance should be responsive to the
allowances in both their aspects.
b. The 6 firms affected by high interest rates but not finance will be responsive to
allowances primarily in their profitability aspect.
c. The 17 firms affected by financial difficulties but not high interest rates will be
responsive to allowances primarily in their liquidity aspect.
d. The 90 firms not affected by either will not be particularly responsive to the
allowances.
Analysis
FIRMS AFFECTED BY DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING FINANCE
Yes No
Responsive to Col. 1 asResponsive to Cal. 4 as
AllowancesPer Cent AllowancesPer Cent
of Cols. of Cols.
YesNo 1+2 YesNo4+5
(1)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



















PARTC: RESPONSIVENESS OF FIRMS BY SIZE AND GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE
R
IndependentSubsidiary
esponsive to Allowances Firms Firms
All
Firms
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: UNDER 100
1.Not stated 2 4 6
2.Yes 9 4 13
3.No 38 11 49
4.Line 2 as per cent of
lines 2+3 19 27 21
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: 100—500
5.Not stated 2 1 3
6.Yes 7 3 10
7.No 19 18 37
8.Line 6 as per cent of
lines 6+7 23 14 21
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: 500 AND OVER
9.Not stated 1 2 3
10.Yes 4 0 4
11.No 6 11 17
12.Line 10 as per cent of
lines 10+11 40 0 19
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: TOTAL
13.Not stated 5 7 12
14.Yes 20 7 27
15.No 63 40 103
16.Line 14 as per cent of
lines 14+15 24 15 21
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Independent Subsidiary All
Responsive to Allowances Firms Firms Firms
GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE:a UNDER— 10%
1. Not stated 1 3 4
2.Yeg 0 I I
3.No 15 7 22
4. Line 2 as per cent of
lines 2+3 0 13 5
GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE:a_ 10 TO+ 10%
5. Not stated 1 1 2
6.Yes 4 3 7
7.No 19 8 27
8. Line 6 as per cent of
lines 6+7 17 27 21
GROWTH OF LABOR F0RcE:a 10 TO 30%
9. Not stated 1 1 2
IO.Yes 9 0 9
11.No 12 7 19
12. Line 10 as per cent of
lines 10+11 43 0 32
GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE:a 30% AND OVER
13. Not stated 2 1 3
14.Yes 6 2 8
15. No 11 12 23
16. Line 14 as per cent of
lines 14+15 35 14 26
GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE:a TOTAL
17. Not stated 5 6 11
18. Yes 19 6 25
19. No 57 34 91
20. Line 18 as per cent of
lines 18+19 25 15 22
GROWTH OF LABOR FORCES NOT STATED
21. 7 7 14
NOTE: Neither growth rate nor responsiveness to allowances stated for one sub-















SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: UNDER 100
1. Not stated 2
2.Yes 0 2 4 3 9 0
3.No 13 10 6 8 37 1
4. Line 2 as per cent
of lines 2+3 0 17 40 27 20
SIZE OF LABOR FORCE: 100—500
5. Not stated 2
6.Yes 0 1 3 2 6 1
7.No 2 7 4 2 15 4
8. Line 6 as per cent
of lines 6+7 0 13 43 50 29
SIZEOF LABOR FORCE: 500ANDOVER
9. Not stated I
]0.Yes 0 1 2 1 4 0
11.No 0 2 2 1 5 1
12. Line 10 as per cent
of lines 10+11 0 33 50 50 44
SIZEOF LABOR FORCE: TOTAL
13. Not stated 1 1 1 2 5 0
14.Yes 0 4 9 6 19 1
15. No 15 19 12 11 57 6
16. Line 14 as per cent
of lines 14+15 0 17 23 35 25
term rate of growth andlonger-term rate of profit, is a statistical relation-
ship which may be interpreted in various ways.
The observations of this study as a whole tend to support the view that
the relationship between profits and growth is not a causal one, but rather
that both growth and profitability are reflections of the character of the
firm.48
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This seems,therefore,thepointatwhichtoconsiderthe
profitability aspect of capital allowances.
C. Profitability Aspects
1. THE ISSUES IN PRINCIPLE
In one respect the effects of capital allowances upon prospective
profitability are a relatively simple matter to discuss, for it requires
no great mathematical skill, though a great deal of application, to
work out the effects of various devices upon the rate of return on
investment, according to any .or all of a wide range of alternative
formulae, and there is no dearth of such calculations. It will surprise
no one that as the assumptions are varied, so generally are the re-
sults. The difficulty lies in knowing which of the alternatives are
the more important empirically.
The criterion favored by the sophisticated is the maximization of
the present value of the expected net returns from the investment
(after all associated costs except depreciation have been deducted).
Because of the discounting procedure involved, this has the advan-
tage of being sensitive to changes in the time pattern of net returns
and depreciation allowances, as well as to changes in their amount.
Using this type of approach and comparing the effects of setting
the rates of investment allowance, initial allowance, and cheap
loans in such a way that they confer equivalent benefits upon an av-
erage firm, Black has shown that "investment allowances will be less
favourable than initial allowances or cheap loans for firms making
longer lived investments than the aYerage." Similarly, a firm with a
higher than average subjective interest rate, r, "will find initial al-
lowances most to its advantage and cheap loans least so." These
findings lead him to the following conclusion:
It has sometimes been suggested that investment allowances are the best
method of the three because they discriminate in favour of firms which are
growing fast; but there is no reason to believe this. If a rapid rate of
expansion leaves a firm short of ready money, and this is reflected in a
high value of r relative to the average firm, then if rates of initial and
investment allowances are fixed so as to make therri equivalent for the
average firm, it is initial allowances which discriminate in favour of the
rapidly growing firm. Investment allowances, as seen above, discriminate- — —— '- —-v- —.-w--—-r--r —- .-,——' ——_—— — -——- --.--.----'--.--- --.-- ----- -
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not in favour of the firm which is growing fastest, but in favour of the
urn which turns its capital over fastest; and there is no reason why the
public interest should require the encouragement of relatively short-lived
investments.49
A different frame of reference can be adopted comparing initial
and investment allowances, on the one hand, and reductions in the
tax rate, on the other, and postulating that changes in allowances
and changes in tax rates are to be so adjusted as to keep the tax
yield constant for the particular firm under consideration; if atten-
tion is then directed to proportional increases in the present value•
rof investments which the firm regards as "marginal" (i.e., the dis-
counted value equals the initial cost before taking the tax conces-
:sions into account), then we could in principle isolate the discrimi-
natory effects of the various tax measures on the profitability of a
particularproject,withouttheissuebeingcomplicated by
'differences in the over-all tax liability between one measure and
.another.
Here there is an important distinction to be made between a firm
considering one investment project in isolation and a finn consid-
ering a whole stream of investment projects through time. Taking
the single investment first, it will be found that if the investor's dis-
count rate is greater than that of the tax authorities (which one
would expect to be the normal case, since the discount rate repre-
sents the opportunity cost of the funds involved), then the various
forms of accelerated depreciation will confer greater benefits than
equal-yield tax rate reductions will. The relative superiority of ac-
celerated depreciation will be greater the higher the investor's dis-
count rate relative to that of the tax authorities, the larger the tax
concession (in spite of the fact that the tax rate reduction is also in-
creased to maintain equivalence in terms of lost tax revenues), and
the longer the normal life of the asset (i.e., the period over which it
-would have been written off under a straight-line system in the ab-
:sence of the depreciation acceleration).
If the firm imposes a short pay-off period requirement, i.e., con-
°J. Black, "Investment Allowances, Initial Allowances and Cheap Loans as
Means of Encouraging Investment," Review of Economic Studies, 1959, pp.444 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
siders only the net revenues accruing during the first few years and
ignores the later ones, but within this short pay-off period still uses
the present-value technique, then the relative superiority of the var-
ious accelerated depreciation provisions over the tax rate reduction
are greatly enhanced.5° In such circumstances the concentration of
benefits in the early years is so important that accelerated deprecia-
tion will generally still be superior to a tax rate reduction even
when the investor's discount rate is lower than that of the tax au-
thori ties.
These conclusions would require modifIcatjon if the returns from
the investment were expected to be very low in the early years but
high later, instead of being constant as has been assumed here, or
if tax rates were expected to be higher in the future, or if taxable
incomes were insufficient to enable full advantage to be taken of
the depreciation concessions.
When investment is regarded as a continuing stream of expendi-
tures through time, we are led to make a further crucial distinction
—between the "transitional" and the "post-transitional" effects of
the various depreciation concessions. Panels 1 through 3 in Chart 2
show the effects upon the time path of total depreciation allowances
of an increase in ordinary annual allowances, initial allowances,
and investment allowances. While each concession has its own char-
acteristic time shape during the transitional phase (from t to t + n),
the post-transitional effects of the first two are nil, since the annual
depreciation charge reverts to its preconcession level (although this
does not mean that the relief obtained during the transitional
phase is subsequently lost). Oniy the investment allowance gives
continuing relief.
Itistherefore surprising that the survey results reported in Table 17,
Part A, indicate that there is no significant difference between firms affected
by these allowances and firms not affected, in the type of investment criteria
used. Hart and Prusmann, on the other hand, found that out of thirty-four
respondents computing a "pay.back period" to determine whether replacement
of plant will be profitable in a financial sense, twenty (59 per cent) reported
a positive response to investment allowance while only thirteen out of forty-
four (30 per cent) did so amongst those computing an average rate of return
(with or without discounting). This compares with thirteen out of fifty-eight
(22 •percent) responding positively to investment allowances amongst those
employing other criteria or reporting none at all.Great Britain 445
CHART2
Effects of Changes in Depreciation Provisions on Annual
Depreciation Charges
Panel1:Accelerated DepreciatEon
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When the investment stream is growing through time and only
the post-transitional effects are considered, the depreciation conces-
sions favor such firms more than tax rate reductions do, while the
latter favor firms making high profits, whether their investment
streams are growing or declining.
In principle, therefore, one would expect each of these allow-
ances to exert a powerful incentive effect on those capital expendi-
tures qualifying for them.
2. THE EFFECTS IN PRACTICE
It is, nevertheless, often asserted that these allowances are severely
circumscribed in their effectiveness. The RCT, for instance, in its
final report argued:
When large-scale capital expenditure is in question it must be quite
usual for a period of three or four years to elapse between the decision
to proceed and the making of the bulk of the expenditure. Plans of this
sort have to be decided upon and carried through independently of the
impact of such allowances. For it is in their nature that they should be
regarded as temporary and variable, and therefore cannot be counted
on as a permanent part of the tax structure. Their stimulus might be very
different if the tax relief could be made dependent upon the decision to
invest, instead of waiting upon the investment itself.
The case is different for small-scale expenditure which can be under-
taken at short notice. Here the encouragement is obvious, particularly for
the smaller concern. ... Theoretically,the inducement could be increased
if the allowance system were avowedly introduced for a limited period
only. ... Onthe other hand we should not be too ready to assume that
a stimulus of this sort favours the best economic planning of resources
it is quite likely to give more impetus to short-term expenditure in
ready-made improvements than to longer-term and more fundamental
planning.51
Against this view it has been argued recently52 that
much investment is of a kind that can be accelerated. Routine replace-
ment of plant and equipment can be speeded up, even by firms which
are at the same time engaged in inflexible long-term projects.... Two
conditions must, however, be satisfied:investment will be accelerated
only if firms can get the equipment and if they are willing and able to
handle more rapid investment....Itis possible that firms might make
a "special effort" in the period of the allowances without reducing their
Paras. 422 and 423.
Mackintosh, Development of Firms, pp. 141-144.Great Britain
efforts in other directions or at other times.... Aperiod of yet more
rapid development, though initially thought of and intended to be short,
will cause some upward shift in firms' ideas of "normal" rates of develop-
ment. It will also give firms experience of higher rates of development
and it will induce improvements of techniques for dealing with rapid
change. The change of atmosphere and improvement of technique are not
wholly lost when the temporary incentive of the allowance is removed.
There must be a fairly strong "ratchet" effect.
It is sometimes suggested that ifitis to encourage a higher rate of
investment in the long run, the investment allowance should be perma-
nent and constant. I... argue...thatthis is not so.
There is one proviso. For the incentive effect to be strong, it is essential
that the allowance should remain available for long enough for under-
standing to spread and for firms to have the opportunity to act deliberately
to obtain more benefit. ... Ifsuch an assurance cannot be given verbally,
has to be established by the record.
There are several other factors, besides the uncertainty generated
by frequent changes in the rates and coverage of the allowances,
which tend to make businessmen less sensitive to them. In the first
place, it appears that many firms make their investment decisions by
rules of thumb which are based on book values rather than on writ-
ten-down values for tax purposes and which may not be able to re-
flect changes in the timing of tax outlays.53 Secondly, "best practice"
among accountants tends to stress the temporary nature of the
benefits accruing from initial allowances. This inculcates an ex-
tremely cautious attitude which may result in such funds being ear-
marked only for highly liquid uses. But it also suggests that no real
increase in profitability results from the granting of the allowance,
for what is given now will shortly be taken back again. When it
comes to investment allowances the relief gained tends to be di-
vorced from the making of the capital expenditure, which is un-
doubtedly correct from a flow-of-funds viewpoint, but, if allied to
inadequate investment criteria, may well severely weaken the im-
pact of the allowance.
In the light of all this, it is perhaps not surprising that the stock
answer of businessmen, when asked about the effects of initial and
investment allowances, is to dismiss them as having little or no
A. S. Ashton, "Investment flanning inPrivate Enterprise," Lloyds
Bank Review, October 1962, esp. pp. 24-26.448 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
effect on investment decisions.54 Yet it appears from the (admittedly
scanty) evidence presented earlierthat,inspiteofallthese
qualifications, as many as one-fifth of firms have been influenced by
these allowances at one time or another.
It would seem desirable, however, to make them more selective in
their operation, and the RCT55 did consider that discrimination by
more narrowly defined asset classes might be feasible.56 Already spe-
cial treatment is accorded to fuel-saving plant and insulation of in-
dustrial and agricultural buildings, and further differentiation
along these lines would make the allowances rather less of a blunt
instrument than they are at present. In this respect it is encourag-
ing to note that one thing about which observers appear to be unan-
imous is that the investment allowance does encourage the smaller
firms to buy new rather than second-hand plant and equipment (the
latter qualifying only for initial allowances).
The report of the National Economic Development Council is,
however, cautious about the role of investment allowances (as it is,
indeed, about the role of tax policy generally) in its program for
growth. It points to the possibility of regional of
such allowances and accepts that "there may at times be a case for
other kinds of differentiation." It also argues that if the "interval
between increasing expenditure on investment and benefiting from
the allowances... couldbe reduced the effectiveness of the allow-
ances would be increased." But on the broader issues, it is forced to
admit that:
It is an open question whether special encouragements to investment are
needed permanently as long-term means of sustaining growth.. .. Itseems
desirable to increase industry's confidence in investment allowances by
See for instance the material quoted by Richard M. Bird, "Countercyclical
Variations of Depreciation Allowances in the United Kingdom," National Tax
Journal, March 1963, pp. 52-54.
Final Report, para. 426.
Many unintended beneficiaries have enjoyed the allowances,e.g.,firms
renting out consumer durables and hotels for bedding, cutlery, and crockery.
Subsequently, in the 1963 Budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer intro-
duced "free write-offs" (or 100 per cent initial allowances) on certain kinds of
capital expenditure in specified areas of high unemployment. In this paper I
have set aside the regional aspects of development programs, not because they
are unimportant, but because they raise more additional issues than I could
encompass within the space allotted.Great Britain 449
giving such assurance as is constitutionally possible that they will not be
reduced without, say, two or three years' notice. With frequent variation
they lose much of their effect because a business planning its investment
cannot be sure what allowances will be in force when the expenditure
is
D. General Conclusions
The two headings, liquidity and profitability, under which the
effects of capital allowances have been discussed, correspond, respec-
tively, to the familiar income effects and substitution effects of eco-
nomic theory, and it will help to draw the threads together if this is
borne in mind.
The profitability (or incentive) or substitution effects of these al-
lowances may prove to be inoperative in practice for three main
reasons: first, because of a faulty appraisal of the situation by busi-
nessmen (although this may lead to oversensitivity as well as
undersensitivity)5°; secondly, because they are not large enough to
overcome the subjective and objective costs of reorganizing invest-
ment plans; and thirdly, because the investments for which they are
granted would have been undertaken even in their absence. In this
last case, although the profitability aspect produced no change in
behavior, the liquidity (or income) effect is still present (as it is not
in the first two cases), and the tax relief accruing because of the al-
lowances will constitute a "windfall" which may be applied in var-
ious ways by the firm.
To the extent that these additional funds are used for invest-
ConditionsFavourable to Faster Growth, paras. 17B, 172, and 171.
• mechanical explanations of the behaviour of businessmen are danger-
ous. A reduction in taxation might alter the climate of opinion so that business
thinks it has a greater incentive to invest, even though it is difficult to trace
the exact reasons for the opinion. Thus the introduction of the investment al-
lowance in the Budget of 1954, with a good deal of official propaganda in
favour of more capital expenditure in industry, appears to have been part
cause of the 1955-6 investment boom, whose embarrassing dimensions caused
the withdrawal of the investment allowances in February 1956. Our Accountants'
Group stressed the important psychological effect of the allowance, which was
viewed as a subsidy to investment, whereas the initial allowance... wasre
garded as a tax-free loan liable to repayment. To many firms the evidence of
official approval for investment was important. The psychological effect was
fully confirmed by the case-studies." Carter and Williams, Industry and Tech-
nical Progress, p. 150.450 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic
ment, this investment may include assets which do not
attract initial or investment allowances (or indeed any kind of capi-
tal allowances at all). Since the number of firms benefiting from the
tax reliefs generated by these allowances appears to be substantially
greater than the number directly influenced by them (whether for
liquidity or profitability reasons), it would seem to be of the utmost.
importance to discover the income elasticity of firms' demand for
different types of capital goods (as well as for capital goods as op-
posed to other uses of funds)60; for it appears prima facie that this
is going to be more important in assessing the quantitative effects of
these allowances than the corresponding price elasticities of de-
m and.
IV. TECHNICAL PROGRESS, INNOVATION,
AND RISK-TAKING
Most of the foregoing analysis has been concerned with the effects
of taxation upon gross capital formation in industry generally. But
a key role in economic growth is usually assigned to one particular
kind of physical investment, namely, that related to research and
development and the introduction of improved techniques. In taxa-
tion policy, this is usually treated as part of the general problem of
risk-taking, which may be affected by taxation through people's
willingness to undertake risky projects and through their ability to
do so.
Although it is commonly assumed that taxation adversely affects
the willingness to take risks, in principle there is no a priori reason
why this should be so, and if the tax treatment of losses and fluc-
tuating incomes were sufficiently generous, there may even be an
incentive rather than a disincentive effect, for then taxation acts as
a cushion against possible losses, as well as a reducer of rewards. If
the incidence of the tax structure generally is such as to fall partic-
ularly heavily upon those who supply risk capital, then again ad-
verse effects might be expected if shortage of finance is a constrain-
80roughand ready exercise of this kind, on a very small scale, was at-
tempted by Mackintosh in Development of Firms, pp. 125-128.Great Britain 451
ingfactor upon the more venturesome. We have seen that the taxa-
tion of income generally may have some bias in this direction,
though it is easy to exaggerate it.
There are, however, some additional features of the tax structure
which deserve special attention in this context. Clearly, the tax
treatment of expenditures on scientific research will be of consider-
able significance for the financing of the initial (and most unpre-
dictable) stage in fostering technical progress. As for the willingness
to take risks, the importance of the tax treatment of losses and fluc-
tuating incomes has already been mentioned, while death duties
and capital gains taxation are frequently brought into the discus-
sion, both in relation to the willingness to take risks and in their
special impact on the sources of risk capital.
Before looking at each of these measures in turn, we must em-
phasize that it is by no means clear what the sources of risk capital
are in a complex economy with a highly developed capital market.
Historically, the private individual backing his fancy may well have
been all-important, but the diminished role of this source of finance
in relation to financial intermediaries of one sort or another must
not be taken as implying necessarily that the well is drying up.
Wright makes an observation, in this connection, which is very per-
tinent to the problems discussed earlier:
Externally raised capital has to be serviced, for even if it is equity capital
the firm's reputation is seriously damaged if it reduces its rate of dividend.
This may deter directors from using external funds on projects where
there is appreciable risk and returns will take some time to mature.
In a sense internal funds go to build up the real "risk capital" of the
company, and greater distribution of profits would diminish this supply
of risk-bearing funds.61
A. The Law
1. EXPENDITURES ON SCiENTIFIC RESEARCH
Current expenditure on scientific research can be deducted in full
in computing taxable profits, provided that it is related to the trade
in question or to the welfare of the workers in it. This is so whether
the research is carried on by the firm itself, a research association, a
Wright in Worswick and Ady, The British Economy, p. 490.452 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
university, or a research institute. Expenditure on capital assets
used in scientific research could, until 1949, be written off at a rate
of 20 per cent per annum, but from 1949 on 60 per cent could be
written off in the first year and 10 per cent in each of the four suc-
ceeding years. Among the latest changes in depreciation provisions
was one permitting scientific research assets to be written off entirely
in the first year. Scientific research assets have also qualified for
investment allowances at a rate of 20 per cent continuously since
1954 (see Table 10).
2. LOSSES AND FLUCTUATING INCOME
If the computation of profits for tax purposes results in the dec-
laration of a loss on the year's trading, the taxpayer must stand that
loss, unless he is entitled to claim relief under one of the following
provisions: 62
a. If the person incurring the loss has other income in the year of
assessment or in the next succeeding year, the loss may be deducted
from such other income.
b. The loss may be carried forward indefinitely and set off
against any. future profits which may arise in the trade in which it
was incurred.
c. If one of two associated companies makes a loss, the other may
by agreement make a "subvention payment" to it, not greater in
amount than the loss in question, this subvention payment then
being deductible from the other company's profits for tax purposes.
d. If the taxpayer goes out of business, a "terminal loss" may be
carried back and set off against the profits of the last three actual
years of trading (but this is the only circumstance in which a loss
can be carried back).
If the amount of profit is insufficient to absorb all the capital al-
lowances to which a taxpayer is entitled, then the claiming of such
allowances also produces what is, in effect, a loss for tax purposes. If
62 positionis, in fact, rather more complicated than is indicated here
because of various provisions intended to prevent the claiming of relief for
losses from becoming a tax avoidance device, especially in connection with
"bond-washing," "dividend-stripping," and "tax-loss farming." On these and
other such devices, see Carl S. Shoup, "Tax Tension and the British Fiscal
System," National Tax Journal, March 1961, pp. 1-40.Great Britain 453
such is the case, then the unused balance of such allowances will be
treated substantially as a loss and dealt with as above.
There are no provisions of any consequence for the averag-
ing of fluctuating incomes as such (i.e., apart from such fluctuations
as may involve the making of losses, as described above). However,
for companies with profits continually in excess of £12,000 per
annum, fluctuations from year to year will not affect the over-all tax
liability except insofar as changes are made in tax rates.
3. DEATH DUTIES
An estate duty is levied on the aggregate net value of all prop-
erty, movable or immovable, either situated in Great Britain or
owned by a deceased domiciled in Great which passes or is
deemed to pass on the death of its owner. Gifts inter vivos made
within five years of death (or one year in the case of gifts for public
or charitable purposes) are usually treated as part of the estate.65
The rates of duty are highly progressive. Various special reliefs are
granted to meet particular hardships, but there are two detailed as-
pects of the duty which are of interest here:
a.If a company is controlled by five persons or less and, within
five years of his death, a deceased has in any way transferred to the
company any of his assets and, furthermore, he had within five
years of his death received any benefits from the company, the com-
pany will be liable to estate duty on the proportion of the compa-
ny's assets which relate to the benefits enjoyed by the deceased.
"Benefits" are very widely defined.
b. The rates of duty are reduced to 55 per cent of what they
would normally be at each point in the scale, in the case of the ag-
ricultural value of agricultural property, and, since 1954, also in the
case of industrial properties occupied for, and machinery and plant
There is a provision which shields surtax payers from the effects of "lumpy"
payment of accumulated dividends; and another which permits authors, in
certain circumstances, to spread over more than one year any lump sums re-
ceived in payment for copyright and to have royalties spread backward over
the period during which the work giving rise to them was being carried on.
Before 1962 immovable property abroad was not liable to duty.
The proportion of such gifts added back into the estate is one-fifth for
those made four to five years prior to death, two-fifths of those made in the
subsequent year, three-fifths of those made in the next year, and so on.4M Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
used for, the purposes of any business which passes or is deemed to
pass (in which an interest passes or is deemed to pass) upon the
death of its owner.
4. CAPITAL GAINS
In principle, the distinction to be drawn here is between those
gains (or losses) that result from the sale of capital assets which are
part of the taxpayers' stock-in-trade and those that arise from the
sale of capital assets which are not. The former are treated as trad-
ing profits (or losses) and taxed as income in the ordinary way,
while the latter are exempt from tax (with the exception of certain
short-term gains, as set out below). The taxation or nontaxation of
capital gains, therefore, turns upon whether or not the gain arose
out of a transaction upon which a "badge of trade" can be pinned.
Six such badges have been identified,6° but since none of them is (in
"The general line of enquiry that has been favoured by appeal Commis-
sioners and encouraged by the Courts is to see whether a transaction that is
said to have given rise to a taxable profit bears any of the 'badges of trade.'
This seems to us the right line, and it has the advantage that it bases itself on
objective tests of what is a trading adventure instead of concerning itself di-
rectly with the unravelling of motive. At the same time we have noticed that
there has been some lack of uniformity in the treatment of different cases
according to the tribunals before which they have been brought. This seems
to us unfortunate and, for the sake of clarity, we have drawn up and set out
below a summary of what we regard as the major relevant considerations that
bear upon the identification of these 'badges of trade.'
"(1) The subject matter of the realization. While almost any form of prop-
erty can be acquired to be dealt in,... propertywhich does not yield to its
owner an income or personal enjoyment merely by virtue of its ownership is
more likely to have been acquired with the object of a deal than property that
does.
"(2) The length of the period of ownership. Generally speaking, property
meant to be dealt in is realized within a short time after acquisition. But there
are many exceptions to this as a universal rule.
"(3) The frequency or number of similar transactions by the same person.
If realizations of the same sort of property occur in succession over a period of
years or there are several such realizations at about the same date a presump-
tion arises that there has been dealing in respect of each.
"(4) Supplementary work on or in connection with the property realized. If
the property is worked up in any way during the ownership so as to bring it
into a more marketable condition; or if any special exertions are made to
find or attract purchasers, such as the opening of an office or large-scale ad-
vertising, there is some evidence of dealing..
"(5) The circumstances that were responsible for the realization. There may
be some explanation, such as a sudden emergency or opportunity calling forGreat Britain 455
alogical sense) either necessary or sufficient to settle the issue one
way or the other and in practice each case is usually treated on its
merits, the application of this part of the tax law is fraught with a
high degree of uncertainty.
The exception to all this arose out of the 1962 Budget, which
defined a new category of income for tax purposes, called "short-
term gains." Broadly speaking, these are gains arising from the dis-
posal of nontrading assets which have been held for less than six
months, or three years in the case of land. Owner-occupied dwell-
ings are exempt. Should a capital loss arise in circumstances in
which, if it had been a gain, it would have been treated as a short-
term gain for tax purposes, then such a short-term loss can be offset
only against short-term capital gains, arising in the same year or
any subsequent year.
B. Evaluation
It is usually asserted that the combined effects of these various
measures is to produce a drag upon economic progress by favoring
the large, established, diversified, and rather conservative compa-
nies, as against the small, new, venturesome, family-type businesses.
The tax treatment of losses and fluctuating income certainly does
support this contention to some extent. On the other hand, the pos-
sibility of evening out (positive) fluctuations in income by a careful
timing of the claiming of statutory depreciation allowances is open
to all firms, though the more heavily capitalized obviously have
more scope for this kind of maneuver. The exemption and abate-
ment provisions of the profits tax67 actually favor the companies
with the smaller profits, which usually means the smaller ones. The
statutory depreciation allowances obviously confer less benefit upon
ready money, that negatives the idea that any plan of dealing prompted the
original purchase.
"(6) Motive. There are cases in which the purpose of the transaction of
purchase and sale is clearly discernible. Motive is never irrelevant in any of
these cases. What is desirable is that it shouLd be realized clearly that it can
be inferred from surrounding circumstances in absence of direct evidence of the
seller's intentions and even, if necessary, in the face of his own evidence."
(Final Report, RCT, para. 116.)
See item 2 under Section [IA above.456 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
firms with low marginal tax rates, however, than upon those paying
'higher rates. Death duties do undoubtedly impinge heavily upon
the capital resources of some unincorporated family businesses, but
whether on this account they should receive further concessions in
the levying of estate duty is a question to which we shall return
shortly. What must also be borne in mind here, as an offsetting
influence, is the exemption from taxation of many kinds of long-
term capital gain, including those realized by selling out as a going
concern a business which the proprietors have built up themselves.
This is widely believed (by both advocates and opponents of a more
comprehensive system of taxing capital gains) to be a means by
which the rewards of growth accrue tax-free to the more enterpris-
ing. The amount of trade, business, and professional assets falling
liable to the estate duty in any one year is only about 1 or 2 per
cent of the total gross capital value of estates.
When it comes to technical, rather than financial, progress, the
inducements offered by the tax provisions on expenditures on scien-
tific research could hardly be more generous. Clearly, they are of
greater benefit, in terms of actual tax remissions, to firms paying the
higher marginal rates of tax, but they may be needed still more des-
perately by the others.
The most comprehensive investigation into the effects of taxation
policy upon technical progress was that conducted by Carter and
Williams, which has been referred to several times already. They
considered and rejected various arguments purporting to show that
taxation had impeded the adoption of new methods. After çonclud-
ing that in general companies were not short of finance, that capital
allowances were adequate, and that the tax treatment of scientific
research expenditures was reasonably generous, they went on:
About death duties we take a different view.... Theessential point
is that estate duty is a large tax ... whichhas to be met in cash. In
consequence, if the control of a family over a business is to be maintained,
money must continually be withdrawn and held idle in order to meet
estate duty without the sale of a controlling interest in the business.
Alternatively, time and ingenuity must be employed in arranging to
reduce the estate of gifts inter vivos, or the business must be disposed of
during the lifetime of the main proprietor. The former, commonly
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leads to family difficulty and the loss of the ability and experience of
elder directors; while the early disposal of the business implies that short-
term developments, yielding a quick return and expected to improve
the chances of a good sale or flotation of the concern, will be favoured
rather than slow-yielding developments.
The net effect of all these difficulties is... inimicalto the development
of the business (including the improvement of its technical equipment)
and may prevent far-sighted planning.... Thedanger is particularly
acute in some declining industries, in. need of technical improvement,
which are dominated by small family firms.
Ifit could be assumed as universally true that the family firm is
unprogressive, and that the assumption of control by larger firms would
speed up technical progress, these harmful effects of estate duties would
not be a matter for concern. But the case-studies show that no such uni-
versal generalization is valid. We conclude that there is a likelihood that
the weight of estate duties is a hindrance to the adoption in certain
forms of improvements in product or process, in which those firms might
have been pioneers.68
A close reading of the reported case studies leads one to discount
this rather hopeful (though guarded) view of the progressive role of
this type of firm,69 and in any case one does not have to show that
there are no progressive family firms in order to justify the proposi-
tion that to merge them with larger concerns may be advantageous
to economic growth. It is a matter of judging the relative progres-
siveness of the two types of concern at that particular stage in the
life of the family business. Moreover, Barna concluded from his in-
vestigations that, more than anything else, "the growth of the firm
is greatly influenced by the personal characteristics and attitudes of
management. Hence greater progress in the firm, and in the econ-
omy, is attainable by an improved social selection of management
Carter and Williams, Industry and Technical Progress, pp. 152-153.
With reference to the cutlery industry, for example, we read: "Family suc-
cession without outside experience has bred a parochial approach." "We have
seen a striking difference between the 'closed' firms and firms which have in
management positions men with ... experienceoutside the industry. We found
these 'outsiders' both in new firms and in a few of the family firms.... We
have also examined four examples of able outsiders introduced into conserva-
tive family firms.... Intwo cases the outsiders were frustrated by the lack of
receptivity... andleft after a very short period.... Inthe other two cases
technologists were introduced, and made a substantial difference to the tech-
nical methods used by the firm." (ibid., pp. 215-216.) See also the firm in the
paper industry reported in ibid., pp. 234-235.458 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
and by development of those characteristics of management which
make for success in business."7° There is no evidence that family
succession is one of these. Here we come up against the whole com-
plex of problems associated with the quality of enterprise in large
firms compared with small ones and in diversified firms compared
with specialized ones, a cross classification which more often than
not overlaps. The apparent economies of scale in research, and in
the deployment of resources generally (both human and material),
favor the large diversified firms against the small specialized ones,
and it is into this latter category that family business usually fall.
For all these reasons, the stress laid by Carter and Williams upon
the advese effects of death duties seems to me to be excessive and
ill-supported by the evidence they themselves adduce.
V. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE TAX STRUCTURE
There are many other taxes which could have been considered in
detail here had space permitted. Indirect taxes have been omitted
entirely from the analysis, although quantitatively they are no less
important than direct taxes. But if the attention paid to direct
taxes in relation to growth has in the past been scant, that paid to
indirect taxes has been virtually nil. Some fairly obvious effects
have been noted, although they have not been examined with any
great rigor or comprehensiveness.
Those indirect taxes which are levied on capital expenditures
(i.e., part of local property taxes and stamp duties) will obviously
act as a countervailing influence to the capital allowances which are
granted through the direct tax system. Some other indirect taxes
fall on current productive inputs, e.g., the duties on gasoline and
fuel oils and the National Insurance Contributions (which are a
sort of payroll tax). These will also influence the factor mix, and
hence the growth potential of the economy. This is a consideration
which is stressed in the Political and Economic Planning Report,
Growth in the British Economy:
Social charges are properly a cost of labour, yet social services have been
fInanced primarily out of general taxation, rather than by taxes which
Barna, Investment and GrowthPolicies,p. 59.Great Britain 459
reveal therealsocial cost of labour. This has the effect of weighting
the economy in favour of the use of labour and against the use of more
capital, and this is an influence tending to prevent industry from making
use of all the worthwhile opportunities for saving labour that exi.st.71
The bulk of indirect taxes are, however, levied on consumer
goods, especially tobacco, alcohol, and consumer durables. These
will influence the pattern of growth selectively and, to the extent
that they fall more on industries with the greatest growth potential
(e.g., radio, electrical and motor vehicles), may reduce the over-all
growth that is desired, which I will not attempt to deal with here.
These consumer goods taxes have also been regarded by some as a
disincentive to work effort and by others as an incentive. The al-
leged disincentive effects of taxation on the supply of effort are a
perennial subject of attention at all levels of discussion, and at least
one observer has given first priority, in gearing British direct taxes
more directly to stimulate economic growth, to an "increase in ine-
quality of incomes functional for development, especially a soften-
ing of the income tax progression in the middle income ranges..
Yet such evidence as we have suggests that the over-all effects of
personal direct taxation have not been very great in either direc-
tion.
An official survey, carried out for the RCT among some 1400 op-
erative and supervisory grades paid on time rates or piece rates and
with opportunities for overtime work, found, in the first place, that
the majority of those interviewed had an insufficiently accurate
knowledge of the system to be in a position to adapt their behavior
sensibly to its impact even if they had desired to do so. Only 217 (15
per cent of the total) even claimed to know approximately the rate
of tax they were paying and roughly how much more they could
earn before moving into the next tax bracket. Of these, 76 (5 per
cent of the total) thought that extra earnings were not worthwhile
if it meant going into the next tax bracket, but of these 76 only 21
were actually right in their claimed knowledge to within 5 shillings
of the amount of tax paid and to within 20 shillings of the margin-
London, 1960,p.136.
72U.K. Hicks, Taxation and Economic Growth," Oxford Economic
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al earnings range. When the actual number of hours worked was
tested, these 76 did not differ significantly from the rest. Further re-
suits of this survey all tend to discount the role of taxation as a de-
terrent to work effort. The survey did, however, find "that there
was a tendency for those who said most emphatically that income
tax was a deterrent to productivity to work less than average hours
—but this attitude was not associated with the way they were af-
fected by income tax. It seems to be an emotional attitude inde-
pendent of fact."73
Break followed this up with a survey of a professional group of
306 solicitors and accountants, self-employed on their own account
or in partnership, the majority of whom faced marginal tax rates of
more than 50 per cent. He found a short-period tax disincentive
among 18 per cent of the total, a short-period incentive effect
among 6 per cent of the total, and an incentive influence at retire-
ment among 52 per cent of those (150) over 45 (the others were not
asked), which meant that some kind of influence was exerted by
taxation in 42 per cent of all cases. Break then reduces his material
by rejecting those whose responses are "vague" or "questionable,"
and he ends up with forty definite disincentive cases and thirty-one
definite incentive cases. These he rates for "economic significance"
according to whether the effect was mentioned on the respondent's
own initiative, the number of times it had been experienced in the
recent past, and the respondent's own estimation of its importance.
From all this, Break concluded:
The chorus of complaints, vehement and eloquent, against "penal" tax-
ation, echoed by the great majority of respondents interviewed ... was
surprisingly infrequently translated into action. It was almost a common-
place for respondents to state categorically that taxes were removing all
their incentives; but when the facts were assembled, about as many were
actually working harder• as were working less.74
He did, however, also find some interesting relationships between
•taxeffects and other variables; namely, those with significant
amounts of income from property were more subject to disincen-
?3 Report,RCT, Cmd 9105, London, 1954, Appendix, para. 7.
G. F. Break, "Income Taxes and Incentives to Work; An Empirical Study,"
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tives than others, all of the disincentive cases occurred among those
with light fixed commitments, and the disincentive cases were not
working less on the average than those unaffected by taxes but the
incentive cases were working more than the unaffected.
Thus, in spite of the fact that both these surveys were conducted
among groups chosen particularly because they might have been ex-
pected to be sensitive to; tax influences, nothing very startling
emerges by way of net disincentive effects. As another survey puts it:
No doubt many works managers and supervisors can testify to difficulties
in persuading operatives to work overtime, where the excuse given is
that additional income tax makes overtime unattractive. These excuses
may be rationalizations. An operative who, consciously or unconsciously,
decides not to do overtime for some reason which does not impress his
supervisor, can fall back upon income tax as his excuse. Income tax
is a popular scapegoat for many things, and dislike of itis a socially
acceptable attitude. The popularity of this view is therefore understand-
able, but the truth of a proposition cannot be judged by the number of
people who subscribe to it.T5
On the whole, the empirical data (though far from conclusive)
seems to bear out what one would expect on theoretical grounds,
namely, that where the income effect is reinforced by the existence
of heavy fixed commitments the incentive effect predominates, but
where income is large in relation to such outgoings people are more
sensitive to marginal tax rates and disincentive effects predominate.
But for the Vast majority, neither effect is significant on balance.
The relation of these findings to the role of indirect taxes has
been demonstrated in principle by Corlett and Hague.76 Taxes lev-
ied on goods which are complementary to leisure will not only have
the usual income effect but will also have a substitution effect on
the price of leisure plus the goods needed to enjoy it, which will
tend to offset the disincentive effects of direct taxes in isolation.
Since consumer durables are likely to be among such complemen-
tary goods, the indirect taxes levied upon them have probably had
such incentive effects. This presumption is strengthened by the
finding of the RCT survey that a large proportion of the respon-
L. Buck and S. Shimmin, "Is Taxation a Deterrent?" Westminster Bank
Review, August 1959, p. 1.8.
W. J. Corlett and D. C. Hague, "Complementarity and the Excess Burden
of Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, No. 54, 1953-54, pp. 21-31.462 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
dents regarded high prices as an incentive, and there can be little
doubt that the taxes on consumer durables were passed on to con-
sumers in this form.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
To the extent that tax policy in postwar Britain has been directed
at all deliberately toward the promotion of economic growth, it has
been concerned mainly with raising the level of capital formation
in private industry. There have been two interwoven strands in this
policy, the one being to insure that adequate finance has been
available and the other to improve incentives to invest.
This policy has clearly been successful inasmuch as industry gen-
erally has not been short of tax-free funds, although the degree of
self-financing possible has not always been as high as some segments
of industry would have wished. But shortages of internally gen-
erated funds have only been crucial for real investment where ex-
ternal finance either has been rejected or else was just not available.
It is arguable whether the tax system should be further adjusted to
facilitate self-financing for firms which could get external finance
but do not wish to do so. And it is doubtful whether the economic
significance of the small minority of firms that experience real
difficulty in getting external finance, even when they have a good
case and are willing to accept it, is great enough to warrant special
tax provisions to ease their difficulties (even supposing that such
provisions could be devised effectively). In short, in spite of the ad-
mitted difficulties sometimes experienced by small rapidly growing
firms in obtaining finance for capital developments, there seems lit-
tle justification for arguing that it is tax policy which is primarily
responsible or that adjustments in taxation are the best means of
meeting their difficulties.
When it comes to incentives to invest, initial and investment al-
lowances appear to have been more successful in stimulating capital
expenditures than many observers have been willing to concede, al-
though their full potentialities, so easily demonstrable in principle,
have not been fulfilled in practice. This is largely due to the real
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plansto.thechanged conditionstheycreate,althoughthis
inflexibility can easily be exaggerated. But it also seems to be due
to an inadequate appraisal by businessmen of the significance of the
allowances, which in turn is due in many cases to the very crude in-
vestment criteria that are used.
Although their selectivity is blurred by their income effects, capi-
tal allowances do at least distribute tax-free finance roughly in pro-
portion to the amount of investing that firms have been doing re-
cently; and if it is safe to assume that the firms which have recently
been investing most are those which on balance are most "growth-
conscious" and have better-quality management, then, even though
the funds may not always be applied directly to finance the kind of
capital formation which policy favors, this distribution of the right
to tax-free funds will probably be more conducive to growth than
that based on any other objective ex post criterion, except possibly
the rate of growth of investment. In the 1963 Budget these capital
allowances were substantially increased, and in areas of high unem-
ployment free write-offs permitted, so that the authorities appear
satisfied that this kind of tax measure is worth pursuing further.
Capital allowances, and particularly the investment allowance,
reduce the costs of capital relative to labor. It has been argued that
much of the trouble with the British economy has been that, de-
spite the wage increases that have already occurred, labor costs are
still too low in many industries. Consequently, labor tends to get
locked into firms and processes where its productivity is relatively
low, and capital allowances are not a strong enough incentive for
many firms to abandon old and outdated (but still serviceable)
plant, machinery, and buildings and to install more productive (but
costly) replacements. An alternative, but complementary, approach,
might therefore be deliberately to make labor generally more ex-
pensive, and here taxation might have an important role to play.
At present the most favored candidate for this role is the value-
added tax. The National Economic Development Council's report,
Conditions Favourable to Faster Growth, says:
It can be argued that atax on value-addedis more conducive to
growth than a special tax on profits.... Totax profits specially is to tax
therewardof efficiency (though profits are not always a criterion of464 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
efficiency) and, generally, the use of capital intensive methods of pro-
duction. The substitution of a value-added tax for the present profits tax
would, on this argument, tend to reduce the tax burden on efficient
relatively to inefficient firms and firms with high output per head as
against firms with low output per head.
The more favourable treatment of investment income under a value-
added tax raises the question of our present practice of varying tax rates
as between earned and unearned income and whether it might not help
growth to tax the dimension of personal wealth and to place less emphasis
on the differential taxation of the, income produced by wealth. ..
Thepracticability of introducing a value-added tax is now being
investigated by a committee appointed by the government, and we
shall doubtless be hearing more of it.
But when all is said and done, the inevitable conclusion, in my
opinion, is that the greatest danger lies in placing too great a load
on tax policy in the promotion of economic growth in the United
Kingdom. It is always tempting to use tax concessions rather than
the more positive step of increasing public expenditures, not only
because they are usually more popular with the more influential
members of the electorate, but also because of their greater adminis-
trative convenience. The tax authorities are already in detailed and
pervasive contact with most of the units in the economy which the
government desires to influence as part of its growth policy, and it
is easier to use these existing channels than to attempt to establish
new ones. The result is an increasingly intricate and unnecessarily
wide-ranging system of tax rebates, reliefs, and remissions to further
objectives that might more cheaply and effectively be achieved by
direct grants or subsidies.
From this viewpoint, it seems to me entirely right that the Na-
tional Economic Development Council report cited above plays tax
reform in a minor key, and chooses as its dominant theme the role
of education. This includes management education, as well as the
training of scientists and technicians and the spread of knowledge
generally. Fiscal concessions can, of course, be pressed into service
here too, but it is primarily a matter of public expenditure. The
same istrue of measures to secure greater mobility of labor,
through retraining and rehousing of displaced labor, and more gen-
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erous redundancy compensation, which are accorded second place
in the report. Any substantial advance that can be made along these
lines will inevitably increase the efficacy of fiscal policy, for it will
make firms more responsive to the tax measures which are already
being deployed. Even in the absence of any further fiscal experi-
mentation, this should help to disperse the myopic euphoria which
is probably the fundamental reason for the slow rate of economic
growth in postwar Britain.
POSTSCRIPT (JUNE 1965)
Since the above report was written there have been further sig-
nificant changes in the tax measures analyzed therein, and some
further research results have been published which shed a little more
light on a few of the issues raised. Nevertheless, no substantial
changes in the earlier analysis seem called for, and what follows is
merely a matter of changing the emphasis a little here and there and
bringing the reader up to date with the more important legislative
changes.
The most substantial changes are those enacted in the 1965 budget,
which introduced a more comprehensive capital gains tax and sub-
jected companies to a unified corporation tax instead of the profits
tax and the income tax (thus separating company taxation from the
taxation of persons and unincorporated businesses). The aspects of
the new corporation tax that are important from our viewpoint are
(1) that it widens once more the tax differential between distributed
and undistributed profits, and (2) that it reduces the actual value to
companies of the initial and investment allowances.
The first effect arises because payments of corporation tax are not
treated in principle as the withholding of tax due on profit distribu-
tions to shareholders, but as an entirely separate tax levy, just as was
the case with the (now superseded) profits tax. But the corporation
tax will be levied at about 35 or 40 per cent (the exact rate is to be
announced in the 1966 budget), compared with a profits tax rate of
15 per cent. Thus when profits are distributed, they will be subject
to corporation tax on total profits plus income tax on the actual dis-
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corporation tax. This, therefore, reopens in a more acute form once
more the questions raised in Section II of this report.
The second effect (the reduction in the effective value of capital
allowances) occurs because the rate of tax on undistributed profits
has been reduced from about 54 per cent to whatever the new rate of
corporation tax turns out to be. The nominal levels of the initial and
investment allowances have been left unchanged, for the time being
at any rate, so their value in terms of actual tax payments saved has
declined proportionately with the fall in the marginal tax rate. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer has said, however, that he intends to
review the whole question before the 1966 budget, and there has
even been talk of replacing these allowances with outright cash sub-
sidies on certain kinds of investment.
Part of the stimulus to this more radical reconsideration of the role
of the allowances has come from the publication of a series of private
research studies documenting various weaknesses in the way the al-
lowances have worked and from the views expressed by businessmen
to the (Richardson) Committee on Turnover Taxation, which re-
ported that "most of them said that they looked principally at the
expected gross return before tax when judging a new investment
project" rather than the net return after taxation.78 This prompted
the publication by the National Economic Development Council of
a pamphlet79 which reviewed the general position as it appeared
from these various studies, and attempted to explain to businessmen
"methods of appraising investment proposals which would bring out
more systematically and reliably the advantages of investing in new
plant and machinery where it will increase efficiency, and thus help
to secure faster growth." Essentially this pamphlet advocates the use
of the discounted cash flow technique.
As regards its major task, the Richardson Committee came out
firmly against adopting a value-added tax, either in place of the
profits tax or in place of the purchase tax (a multirate, single-stage
sales tax levied at the wholesale stage upon a wide range of consumer
goods, but exempting food and fuel, and falling most heavily upon
consumer durables). It rejected the argument that such a change
78CommandPaper 2300, London, 1964, especially paragraphs 142-173, 225-231,
280-285, and 315-322.
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would stimulate investment, largely because it was convinced by the
statements of the businessmen it consulted that tax considerations
were of little or no consequence in such decisions. This view has not
won such ready acceptance elsewhere, however.80
It will, therefore, be seen that recent developments in the U.K.,
far from settling any of the major issues raised in this report, have
merely accentuated them so that they now arise in an even more
acute form than at the time when the report was written.
COMMENT
A. R. PREST, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
Anyone who has to write a paper on the contribution of tax policy
to growth in postwar Britain is under a severe handicap simply be-
cause the British economy has grown relatively slowly during most
of this period. Although one can argue about the details of this per-
formance and maintain, say, that the postwar record looks different
according to the precise span of years covered or that it does not
differ so very much from the record of many previous years, the
broad outlines of the international comparison are not seriously in
dispute. It follows, therefore, that any observer of the British scene
is limited to a rather negative role: he can record the changes in tax
policy over the period and perhaps show that they had no markedly
adverse effects on the economy. But he has relatively little material,
at least on the aggregate level, on which to base any conclusions
about the efficiency of different measures in promoting vigorous or
sustained growth. So he has to work with one hand tied behind his
back, as it were.
In writing his paper, Alan Williams has imposed further limits
on himself over and above these external constraints. It would be
going too far to say that he has placed his other hand behind his
back, but the metaphor may nevertheless bring my argument home.
First, he does not at any point give a synopsis of the policies or de-
vices which he himself regards as most essential to the growth pro-
cess. He has, in fact, specifically refused to undertake any such role,
and although he does come out of his shell in the very last para-
for instance, The Economist, Dec. 5. 1964,pp. 1151-1153.468 Foreign Tax Policies and Economic Growth
graph of the paper, this is hardly sufficient to redress the balance.
Obviously, no one can be expected to produce a complete growth
model, modern conveniences and all, in a paper on taxation. But I,
for one, would have found it helpful to know Williams' views on
some important questions. For instance, he asks at the end of the
paper whether it would be sensible to complement those policies
aimed at reducing the effective price of capital goods by others de-
signed to raise labor costs. This presupposes that the key to greater
efficiency in British industry is to be found in direct incentives to
adjust capital/labor ratios. This may be true; but one would like to
know whether Williams really accepts this position and, if he does,
why he prefers it to the alternative hypothesis that the main cause
of labor hoarding, etc., by industrialists has been past or potential
excess demand for their products. More generally, unless one has
some reasonably firm ideas about what is likely to promote growth,
how can one hope to make tax policy prescriptions for it?
Quite apart from the absence of any connected discussion of these
various general issues, the author further limits his field by concen-
trating on a relatively small number of detailed problems. As a con-
sequence, some points which have attracted a good deal of discus-
sion over the years are rather perfunctorily dealt with; and others
are virtually exempt from scrutiny. Among the former, for instance,
are education and personal savings; among the latter, exports and
imports. It is quite true, as Williams says, that education in the
U.K. is primarily a matter of public expenditure rather than reve-
nue policy. But there are revenue aspects to the matter. The earned
income relief system, whereby earned income is taxed at a lower
rate than unearned, can be defended as an incentive to invest in
human rather than physical capital. And the whole question of tax
incentives to firms to release employees for training or retraining
courses merits consideration. In contrast to the lengthy discussion of
the tax incentives for corporate saving, the author says relatively
little about any such incentives for personal saving. It might have
been worth pointing out that tax relief for life insurance and su-
perannuation was widened over the period, particularly as a result
of the 1956 Finance Act which made substantial concessions to self-
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small savings tax concessions—National Savings Certificates, Premi-
um Bonds, the abolition of taxation on owner-occupied property in
1963, and so on—might also have been mentioned. I found it sur-
prising that Williams did not pay more attention to the various dis-
cussions over the years about tax incentives for exports. It has, after
all, been said many times that a somewhat better balance-of-pay-
ments position would have permitted a faster rate of growth of do-
mestic demand for British products. Tax relief to exporters was one
of the main reasons for setting up the Committee on Turnover
Taxation in April 1963. The author mentions this Committee, but
without reference to this point.
On the imports side, it has often been maintained (e.g., in the
contest of the EEC negotiations) that reductions of British tariff
barriers would act as a cold shower on the entrenched forces of
British business. It would have been helpful to know the author's
views on this point too.
But it is always easy for any critic to offer a long list of points
which an author has not dealt with, and easier still for an author to
rebut any such accusations on the grounds that he could not deal
with everything. Let me now turn to a more detailed commentary
on the subjects the author did treat intensively.
In his discussion of the relative tax treatment of distributed and
undistributed profits in Section II, the author singles out three
questions: the effects on saving of taxes that differentiate between
distributed and undi.stributed company profits, the ease with which
different types of firms could get finance, and the linkage between
differential profits taxation and real capital formation. As a rough
summary, his answers are that corporate saving was reduced after
the replacement of the differential profits tax by a flat rate tax in
1958, but that there is not much evidence to show that many firms
were short of finance or that real capital formation was affected
thereby; part of the explanation of this complex .of events is the
great upsurge in personal saving over the period.
On the proportion of profits distributed, there are just two points
worth adding. The first is that Table 2 gives a slightly exaggerated
impression by taking 1951, with 18.9 per cent of company income
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figure to have been as high as 26.0 per cent. The change from that
year—the time of the Cripps restraint period, as well as some
differentiation against distributed profits—to, say, the figure of 28.5
per cent for 1960 (when profit distribution was no longer a matter
for black looks from the authorities) is not quite so impressive as
the changes recorded in Table 2. The second point is that the 1961
percentage (32.2) may have been influenced by the surtax relief of
the 1961 Budget, which effectively reduced personal taxes on invest-
ment income for many people. However, both these are minor de-
fects in Williams' argument, which I do not seriously challenge. It
might, incidentally, be noted that his figures offer some, though not
conclusive, support for the hypothesis that profits taxes are not
fully passed on to consumers.
On the rest of this section, my first point is that I should have
liked to see some discussion of the net tax incentive for profits re-
tention which still remains in the present British tax structure.
This would entail comparing the over-all weight of tax on undistrib-
uted profits with that on distributed profits. The conventional ar-
gument is that a profits tax on companies can be justified insofar as
the representative dividend recipient is a substantial surtax payer.
Whether, on balance, the total tax paid by companies and their
shareholders is reduced or increased by profit retention in a world
where an increasing proportion of equity shares is held by insur-
ance companies and the like is an immensely complicated but very
important matter. That it is important is borne out by some inves-
tigations which the author does not mention, i.e., those of I.M.D.
Little,1 who recently investigated growth rates of British companies
and found virtually no positive relationship between them and
lagged undistributed profits. The partial regression coefficient had
the wrong sign in eight out of thirteen groups and was not
significant for four out of the remaining five. Although Little warns
that this investigation is not as complete as might be desired, it still
seems to me highly important and highly relevant to this section of
Williams' paper.
On Section III on capital allowances, I think it is worth adding a
I. M. D. Little, °Higgledy Piggledy Growth," Bulletin of the Oxford Uni-
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word or two on some of the very recent concessions made in the
U.K., In November 1962, the general level of investment allowances
was raised so that since that date plant and machinery has attracted
a 30 per cent allowance (plus a 10 per cent initial allowance) and
buildings a 15 per cent allowance (plus a 5 per cent initial allow-
ance). The time period for writing off capital equipment of all
kinds has been reduced so that the minimum annual allowance (for
plant and machinery) on the reducing-balance basis is 15 per cent;
and now industrial buildings are allowed a 4 per cent straight-line
basis. A limiting case is that capital expenditure on scientific re-
search assets can now be written off completely in the first year.
Since April 1963, a system of free depreciation—analogous to that
formerly prevailing in Sweden—has been introduced for new min-
ing works and for certain new plant and machinery in specified de-
velopment districts in the U.K. The extraordinary liberality of
these provisions should be emphasized. For instance, it is now possi-
ble for an unincorporated business to make a profit out of buying a
capital asset even if it never brings in a penny of revenue.2 A com-
pany buying a scientific research asset now pays for only about 32
per cent of the cost itself.3 And investment of £100 in new machin-
ery, etc., in specified districts now attracts a 10 per cent grant (i.e.,
£10) plus an allowance of 130 per cent of £90 (i.e., £117) against
tax in the year following the expenditure, if the option to write
off 100 per cent of capital value in the first year is taken. It is hard
to imagine more liberal concessions than these; if they do not pro-
duce a higher level of investment, it is difficult to see what would.
Although the disentangling of cause and effect in these matters is
inevitably complex, it is at any rate worth noting that there have
been signs in recent months of responsiveness by industry to these
See "Expense Is My Object—A Play in One Act" by "Santa Claus," British
Tax Review, September-October 1962. To illustrate, £260 can be reclaimed in
allowances on a machine costing £200. At the top rate of surtax (17s.9d. in
the £),thisreduces tax liability by £230.15s. The present value of the profit
from this operation can, therefore, be put at about £25, assuming an interest
rate of 5 per cent (implying a discount rate, net of tax, of some 0.5 per cent)
and a six-year recovery period.
3E.g.,ifthe assetcosts £100, allowances total£130. At IOs.9d. in the
£, this means a tax saving of about £70; allowing for a year's delay in claiming
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new concessions, e.g., the latest Federation of British Industries sur-
vey of investment intentions shows a clear change from the previous
one.
On a more general plane, I would have liked Williams' treatment
of the theoretical advantages of different types of concessions to be
a little fuller. Discussion of the pros and cons of free depreciation
would have been helpful; and the meaning of the formulae in
Chart 2 could have been made more explicit. I found his summary
of the inquiries into the effects of capital allowances on business-
men's plans very illuminating; but I wish that it had been accom-
panied by a multiple regression analysis of the factors determining
capital formation over this period. From what I have seen of some
unpublished work in this field, it would seem that the role of in-
vestment and initial allowances was not negligible. Finally, I would
certainly agree that the psychological reactions of businessmen to
incentives of this sort may well be imponderable; there is no need
to mention to an American audience the attitude of the business
community in the U.S. to the abortive investment incentive propos-
als of 1961.
Williams refers to the possibilities of introducing a value-added
tax in the U.K. This proposal has been put forward with the twin
objectives of promoting, first, exports and, second, capital invest-
ment, efficiency, etc. I do not propose to go into the ramifications of
this complex subject, but would simply make two points. Given the
very generous income and profits tax allowances for capital invest-
ment which are now available in the U.K., it is not clear that the
additional incentive to invest could be very large if one switched
from the present system of taxing company profits to a value-added
tax. Secondly, if the proposal crystallizes as the replacement of in-
come tax on undistribu ted company profits, as well as profits tax,
by the value-added tax, I would expect these to lead to larger profit
retentions than in the immediate past and, on the basis of Little's
investigation, I would judge this to be a very dubious move. There
are obviously many argumentsfavor of value-added taxation; all
Isuggesting is that the above not be neglected when
everything is weighed in the balance
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worthy of expansion. rroward the end of the paper he suggests that
tax benefits might be related to the rate of growth of investment
rather than the level of investment. This is rather reminiscent of
the proposal by Baumol that subsidies to firms should be based on
the rate of growth of value added. Many problems arise with such
devices. For instance, do we have a symmetrical system whereby re-
ductions in investment are taxed, as well as increases subsidized, or
not? If we do, this could mean that a firm investing less because of a
decline in demand for its products might pay more, rather than less,
tax than previously. If we have an asymmetrical system, and subsi-
dize increases but not tax decreases, then this could mean larger
total subsidies over a given period to a firm with a fluctuating in-
vestment record than to one with steadily growing investment, even
if the over-all increase in the level of investment were the same in
both cases.4
I have spent my time criticizing Williams' arguments and elabo-
rating on them. That is inevitable; it is why I am here. But I do
not wish to close without putting on record that I consider this
paper to be an extremely lucid, well-balanced, and well-informed
survey of the British situation since World War II.
E.g., assume a 20 per cent rebate on annual increases in gross investment.
Then if firmAspends successively £90, £120, £160, and £200 on investment,
it receives a total allowance over the whole four-year period of £22. If firm B
spends £90, £180, £100, and £200 in each successive year, its total allowance
would be £38. Over the time period considered, both firms have pushed up
their capital formation to the same extent, but firm B nevertheless gets a bigger
rebate than firm A.
-